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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the midst of an explosion in Internet content 
and applications. In 2012 alone, Internet traffic in the United States grew 
thirty-six percent over the previous year, reaching a volume sixteen times 
greater than the entire U.S. Internet in 2005.1 Peak-time traffic grew even 
faster,2 driven by the rising popularity of bandwidth-intensive real-time 
entertainment such as Netflix, which by itself generates nearly one-third of 
all downstream traffic during peak hours.3 And that growth will continue 
for the foreseeable future: network equipment giant Cisco Systems expects 
U.S. Internet traffic nearly to triple between now and 2017.4 Globally, more 
data will traverse the network in 2017 than in every year from 1984 
through 2012 combined.5 
This steady growth in demand, and the continuing capital investment 
required to meet it, has prompted broadband providers to reconsider the 
flat-rate pricing model that has dominated the consumer Internet access 
market since the late 1990s. Flat-rate, or all-you-can-eat pricing, has proven 
popular with consumers, primarily because such plans are simple and 
predictable. Customers know how much they will pay for broadband access 
each month, and can use the Internet without worrying that excessive use 
will eat into the family budget. But flat-rate unlimited use can also create 
                                                 
1. VNI Forecast Highlights, CISCO SYS., http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/ 
sp/vni/vni_forecast_highlights/index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (click “Filter by 
Country”, click the United States, and click “2012 Year in Review”) (“In the United States, 
average Internet traffic grew 36% in 2012. . . . Internet traffic was 240 Petabytes per day in 
2012, up from 179 Petabytes per day in 2011. . . . U.S. Internet traffic in 2012 was 
equivalent to 16x the volume of the entire U.S. Internet in 2005.”). 
2. Id. (same instructions) (“In the United States, peak Internet traffic grew 41% in 
2012.”).  
3. SANDVINE, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT 2H 2012 6 (2012) [hereinafter 
Sandvine 2012]. Sandvine defines peak time as the period within which aggregate network 
traffic is within five percent of its highest daily value. Id. at 29. On an average day, the peak 
time for downstream Internet traffic in North American fixed networks is roughly from 9:00 
until 11:30 p.m. SANDVINE, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA REPORT FALL 2011 5 (2011) 
[hereinafter Sandvine 2011]. Sandvine estimates that peak times are becoming shorter but 
more intense, as “subscribers are concentrating the same amount of activity within an 
increasingly narrow slice of time.” Id. As discussed below, peak times on wireless networks 
are more varied and unpredictable. 
4. See VNI Forecast Highlights, supra note 1 (click “Filter by Country”, click the 
United States, and click “2017 Forecast Highlights”) (“In the United States, Internet traffic 
will grow 3.2-fold from 2012 to 2017 . . . . Internet traffic will be 783 Petabytes per day in 
2017, up from 240 Petabytes per day in 2012. . . . [P]eak Internet traffic will grow 3.6-
fold.”). 
5. See id. (“Globally, IP traffic will reach an annual run rate of 1.4 Zettabytes in 
2017.”); ROBERT PEPPER, MOBILE NETWORKS IN A ZETTABYTE WORLD: TRENDS FROM 
CISCO’S VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX 3 (2012) (“By 2016, global IP traffic will reach an 
annual run rate of 1.3 zettabytes per year[.] . . . [M]ore traffic will traverse global networks 
than from the beginning of the Internet to today . . . combined. 1984-2012: 1.2 Zettabytes”), 
available at http://www.gsma.com/spectrum/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Dr_Robert-
_Pepper_Cisco_Public_Policy-Forum_Data_Demand.pdf. 
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inefficient network operation. Because price is not tied to online use, 
consumers have little incentive to economize their bandwidth consumption. 
Moreover, network costs are spread evenly throughout the customer base, 
forcing light Internet users to subsidize heavier users’ data-intensive 
lifestyles. 
Broadband providers have begun experimenting with alternative 
pricing strategies to address these inefficiencies. This movement is most 
visible in the wireless industry, where the smartphone revolution grew 
much faster than providers expected. Smartphone use, in turn, spawned a 
new industry in mobile content and applications and at times has caused 
wireless broadband demand to outstrip network capacity (a phenomenon 
sometimes called the “iPhone effect”).6 Tiered pricing has now become the 
norm in wireless broadband, where consumers face a wide range of pricing 
and service options.7 Many residential fixed broadband providers have also 
explored tiered service, monthly data caps, and overage charges. 
While regulators8 and many academics9 have largely supported this 
shift, many public interest groups have reacted with skepticism.10 Groups 
such as Public Knowledge and Free Press, both of which helped drive the 
net neutrality movement, have argued that broadband providers should 
                                                 
6. Crystal Lyons, Data Caps—Opportunities and Concerns for Developers, 
BOSTINNO (July 2, 2012, 9:39 AM), http://bostinno.com/channels/data-caps-opportunities-
and-concerns-for-developers/; David Goldman, AT&T Isn’t Nearly As Bad As You Think, 
CNNMONEY (July 8, 2013, 6:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/08/technology/ 
mobile/att-4g-network/index.html (describing the iPhone effect on AT&T’s 3G network). 
7. See, e.g., Rene Ritchie, AT&T Adds Data Caps, Changes Rates for iPhone Plans, 
Will Support Tethering for Extra Charge, IMORE (June 2, 2010, 7:48 AM), 
http://www.imore.com/2010/06/02/att-adds-data-caps-rates-iphone-plans-plans-support-
tethering/. 
8. FCC Boss Backs Usage-Based Pricing for Cable Internet Access, NBCNEWS 
(May 22, 2012, 4:14 PM) http://www.nbcnews.com/business/fcc-boss-backs-usage-based-
pricing-cable-internet-access-788008?franchiseSlug=businessmain; Michael Turk, Public 
Policy Discussion With FTC and FCC Commissioners, CABLETECHTALK (June 15, 2011) 
http://www.cabletechtalk.com/the-cable-show/public-policy-discussion-with-ftc-and-fcc-
commissioners/; but see Karl Bode, FCC Boss Suddenly 'Concerned' About Bandwidth 
Caps?, DSLREPORTS.COM (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/FCC-
Boss-Suddenly-Concerned-About-Bandwidth-Caps-121154 (Former Chairman 
Genachowski recently questioned the propriety of data caps). 
9. Hearing on Net Neutrality Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Prof. Lawrence Lessig) (“I believe, for 
example, that consumer-tiering should be encouraged.”); Cecilia Kang, Comcast Illegally 
Interfered with Web File-Sharing Traffic, FCC Says, WASH. POST (July 30, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2008/07/29/AR2008072902077.html (last visited July 23, 2013) (quoting Prof. 
Timothy Wu, who describes usage-based pricing as “probably the fairest system going”). 
10. See, e.g., ANDREW ODLYZKO ET AL., KNOW YOUR LIMITS: CONSIDERING THE ROLE 
OF DATA CAPS AND USAGE BASED BILLING IN INTERNET ACCESS SERVICE 47 (2012); Letter 
from Free Press, Consumers Union, Public Knowledge, and New America Foundation to 
Sen. John D. Rockefeller and Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Letter 
from Free Press], available at http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/ 
PI_letter_Senate_Commerce_OVDtrends_Apr2012_FINAL.pdf. 
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charge customers the same amount regardless of use.11 They fear that 
monthly consumption limits create artificial scarcity, allowing providers to 
pad profits and avoid future network upgrades. They also assert that fixed 
broadband providers may use monthly limits to shield their cable 
businesses from Internet-based competitors.12 These arguments have found 
an audience at the Justice Department, which is investigating whether data 
caps violate antitrust law.13 In late 2012, Senator Ron Wyden introduced a 
bill that would regulate and limit the practice.14 
This article explores the trend toward usage-based broadband pricing. 
It finds that data caps and other forms of metered consumption are not 
inherently anti-consumer or anticompetitive. Rather, they reflect different 
pricing strategies through which a broadband company may recover its 
costs from its customer base and fund future infrastructure investment. By 
aligning costs more closely with use, usage-based pricing shifts more 
network costs onto those consumers who use the network the most. 
Companies can thus avoid forcing light Internet users to subsidize the data-
heavy habits of online gamers and movie torrenters. Usage-based pricing 
may also help alleviate network congestion by encouraging customers, 
content providers, and network operators to use broadband more 
efficiently. 
As opponents of usage-based pricing have noted, data caps may be 
deployed for anticompetitive purposes. But regulators should be concerned 
primarily when a firm with market power exploits that power in a way that 
harms consumers.15 Absent a specific market failure, which critics have not 
yet shown, broadband providers should be free to experiment with usage-
based pricing and other pricing strategies, using these as tools in their 
arsenal to meet rising broadband demand. Public policies allowing 
providers the freedom to experiment best preserve the spirit of innovation 
that has characterized the Internet since its inception.  
This article critically examines the policies underlying this shift 
toward usage-based pricing. Part I describes usage-based pricing generally 
                                                 
11. ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 54. 
12. See id. at 56. As discussed in greater detail below, this concern was brought into 
sharp focus when Comcast announced that customers who subscribe to both broadband and 
the company’s Xfinity cable service would be permitted to watch Xfinity using an app on 
the Microsoft Xbox without incurring charges against the customer’s data cap, even though 
Netflix and other Internet-based video streamed through the Xbox would be counted against 
the customer’s cap. See App’ns of Comcast Corp., Gen. Electric Co., & NBC Universal, Inc. 
for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, Petition to Enforce 
Merger Conditions, FCC MB Docket No. 10-56 (fil. Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Petition to 
Enforce Merger Conditions]. 
13. Cecilia Kang, Justice Dept. Probing Cable Companies’ Internet Data Limits, 
WASH. POST (June 13, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-
13/business/35460748_1_cable-companies-internet-data-antitrust. 
14. Data Cap Integrity Act, 112 Cong. (2012), available at 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/data-cap-integrity-act-bill-text. 
15. Market power is the ability for a corporation to raise its prices above the 
competitive level by reducing output. See PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, 
MICROECONOMICS 358 (2008). 
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and details its rise in both wireless and fixed broadband service. Part II 
analyzes usage-based pricing as a cost recovery tool, a way that a 
broadband provider can allocate its fixed costs across its customer base. 
Part III considers the pricing strategy as a method of managing broadband 
network congestion. Part IV examines the potential anticompetitive uses of 
a usage-based pricing strategy. Finally, Part V highlights the need for 
transparent policies and consumer education to facilitate the shift toward 
usage-based pricing, and offers policy recommendations to protect 
consumers. 
II. THE SHIFT TO USAGE-BASED PRICING IN BROADBAND 
MARKETS 
A. A Taxonomy of Usage-Based Pricing 
“Usage-based pricing” is an umbrella term for any billing system that 
charges on the basis of consumption. Although Internet access providers 
abandoned usage-based pricing for consumers early in the industry’s 
history,16 it is common in other parts of the Internet ecosystem and in many 
other network industries.17  In its simplest form, known as “metering,” the 
firm charges a basic fee per unit consumed. For example, telephone 
companies such as AT&T and Sprint historically charged a certain rate per 
minute for long-distance calls. The price per minute became a high-profile 
point of competition between carriers.18  
In more sophisticated variations, companies can use metered pricing 
to induce particular customer behavior. Many companies offer a per-unit 
discount on large purchases, to encourage higher-volume consumption. 
Alternatively, some utilities such as water companies charge a higher rate 
                                                 
16. During the early 1990s, dial-up Internet providers typically offered Internet access 
at a per-minute rate. This changed in 1996, when industry leader America Online changed to 
a flat-rate, unlimited use pricing model. The company was initially unprepared for the 
increased demand generated by the shift, which led to numerous blackouts and busy signals. 
See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 975, 986 (2006) (citing NINA MUNK, FOOLS RUSH IN: STEVE CASE, JERRY LEVIN, 
AND THE UNMAKING OF AOL TIME WARNER 84 (2004)). But the move nonetheless proved 
popular with consumers, leading competitors to follow suit. As dial-up yielded to higher-
capacity broadband networks, competitors retained the unlimited flat-fee model. 
17. Network industries are those in which consumers attach themselves to one or more 
networks, for example, communications and transportation networks, such as telephone, 
computer, railroad, or electricity networks. Networks tend to exhibit positive feedback due 
to demand-side scale economies: large networks are more attractive to buyers, and thus tend 
to get larger. See Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of 
Justice, Speech before the American Law Institute and American Bar Association: Antitrust 
in Network Industries (Jan. 25, 1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/0593.pdf. 
18. See, e.g., Edward Cavanaugh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 87 OR. L. REV. 147, 
198 (2005) (discussing long-distance competition in the wake of the 1984 breakup of the 
AT&T monopoly). 
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per unit after consumption reaches a certain threshold, to encourage 
conservation and penalize customers who draw more than their neighbors 
from a common pool.19 Some electricity utilities, facing above-capacity 
demand during peak times, charge a different rate per kilowatt-hour for 
peak and non-peak electricity use, hoping to induce customers to shift 
nonessential consumption.20 Similarly, wireless companies famously 
offered free nights and weekends to customers, partly to shift call volumes 
to periods when the telephone network was underutilized.21  
Companies may also adopt a two-part tariff, wherein the customer 
pays a fixed rate per month for access to the network and an additional fee 
per unit for consumption on that network. Two-part tariffs are attractive to 
network industries because the fixed fee ensures that all customers 
contribute in some measure toward common network costs, while the per-
unit fee recovers marginal costs efficiently, and can also shift some 
network costs onto heavier users. Tiered pricing is one form of a two-part 
tariff that is common in the wireless telephone industry. Under tiered 
pricing, customers could choose among wireless plans, each of which 
offers a certain number of minutes per month at a fixed rate.22 Each 
customer receives unrestricted calling each month up to his or her plan 
limit, and then incurs an additional per-minute charge for consumption 
exceeding that threshold.23  
B. Usage-Based Pricing for Fixed Broadband Service 
Although residential consumers are accustomed to flat-rate unlimited 
Internet access, it is important to note that usage-based pricing has long 
been the norm in many other parts of the Internet ecosystem. Content 
providers often get online by purchasing Internet transit service from a 
transit provider.24 Transit providers act as gateways allowing content 
providers to route their data to the Internet. Smaller transit providers also 
often purchase transit service from larger networks.25 Transit is typically 
sold on a metered basis: customers pay based upon the volume of traffic 
they send each month.26 Many customers pre-commit to certain volumes 
                                                 
19. See SCOTT WALLSTEN, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. PROGRESS SNAPSHOT, 
MANAGING THE NETWORK? RETHINK PRICES, NOT NET NEUTRALITY 3 (Release 3.12, Oct. 
2007). 
20. See e.g., On Peak & Off Peak Hours, PACIFIC POWER, 
http://www.pacificpower.net/ya/po/otou/ooh.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2013). 
21. See Jerry Ellig, Intercarrier Compensation and Consumer Welfare, 2005 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 97, 105 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, 
and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 206-07 (2008). 
22. See Ellig, supra note 21, at 104-06. 
23. Id. 
24 See CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET 94 (2012); WILLIAM B. NORTON, 
THE INTERNET PEERING PLAYBOOK 28 (2013).   
25 NORTON, supra note 24, at 28. 
26 Importantly, transit rates typically do not reflect a customer’s total monthly bandwidth 
usage, but rather the customer’s peak bandwidth usage. See YOO, supra note 24, at 94; 
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each month at a “committed rate”, and pay an incremental rate-per-unit for 
traffic above the committed rate.27 To avoid transit fees and to route 
content more quickly to its destination, some content providers choose 
instead to purchase access from private content-delivery networks such as 
Akamai or Limelight, which also typically charge customers based on 
volume.28 
Many fixed broadband providers are moving toward usage-based 
pricing for residential consumers as well. More specifically, several have 
adopted data caps, which can function as a two-part tariff. A consumer 
typically purchases a fixed number of gigabytes that he or she may 
consume monthly, often followed by some penalty if the consumer exceeds 
the cap. Comcast adopted a 250-gigabyte monthly cap on residential 
broadband customers in 2008.29 The company contacted customers who 
                                                                                                                 
NORTON, supra note 24, at 31-32. The transit provider maintains a meter that records the 
traffic the customer sends for transit. Every five minutes, the meter is sampled, and the 
transit provider records the total traffic since the last five-minute interval. A the end of the 
month, each five-minute interval is converted into megabits-per-second, and rank-ordered 
from lowest to highest. The megabits-per-second at the 95th percentile is used to determine 
the customer’s bill for the month, so that the customer is not penalized for occasional, 
unusually large traffic bursts. The transit provider multiplies the 95th-percentile megabit-per-
second rate by the contractual price per megabit/second to calculate the customer’s monthly 
bill.  NORTON, supra note 24, at 30-32. 
27 NORTON, supra note 24, at 32-33. 
28 Id. at 149; see, e.g., Dan Rayburn, Video CDN Data: Pricing, Contract, Volume, and 
Market Sizing Trends, May 14, 2012, available at http://blog.streamingmedia.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/2012CDNSummit-Rayburn-Pricing.pdf (last visited August 14, 
2013) (showing that CDN customers typically pay on a per-GB-delivered or per-Mbps-
sustained basis). 
29. See Announcement Regarding an Amendment to Our Acceptable Use Policy, 
COMCAST CORP., http://xfinity.comcast.net/terms/network/amendment/ (last visited Aug. 10, 
2013) [hereinafter Comcast Acceptable Use]. The policy took effect on October 1, 2008. 
This change came shortly after the FCC sanctioned the company for secretly degrading 
peer-to-peer networking traffic as a method of managing network congestion. See Formal 
Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly 
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 
13028, 13066 (2008) [hereinafter Formal Complaint of Free Press], vacated, Comcast 
Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). As a result, many commenters have suggested 
Comcast adopted its data cap to solve the congestion problems caused by peer-to-peer 
traffic, although Comcast did not explicitly make this connection. 
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exceeded the cap30 and reserved the right to terminate service to repeat 
offenders, though it is unclear how often it actually did so.31  
Shortly thereafter, Time Warner Cable experimented with a much 
lower data cap and an overage charge in some markets, but canceled the 
pilot program after negative customer feedback.32 AT&T and CenturyLink 
have also adopted data caps,33 although Verizon has not. In May 2012, 
Comcast eliminated its 250-gigabyte cap and since then has begun testing 
other pricing models in some markets, including a soft cap of 300 gigabytes 
with a per-gigabyte overage charge for exceeding the cap.34  
Of course, the effectiveness of a data cap depends significantly on 
customers’ understanding of how much data their online activities 
consume, and how close they come to the cap each month. A recent 
Sandvine report on network use states that the mean monthly data 
                                                 
30. Comcast Acceptable Use, supra note 29 (“The only difference is that we will now 
provide a limit by which a customer may be contacted. As part of our pre-existing policy, 
we will continue to contact the top users of our high-speed Internet service and ask them to 
curb their usage. If a customer uses more than 250 GB and is one of the top users of our 
service, he or she may be contacted by Comcast to notify them of excessive use.”); How 
Comcast Reads Your Data Usage, COMCAST CORP., http://customer.comcast.com/help-and-
support/internet/data-usage/ (last updated Aug. 8, 2013) (“If you exceed 250 GB again 
within six months of the first contact, your service will be subject to termination and you 
will not be eligible for either residential or commercial Internet service for twelve 
months.”). 
31. Public Knowledge, a public interest group that has challenged data caps, has 
profiled Andre Vrignaud, a gaming consultant whose access was terminated after he 
exceeded the cap for two consecutive months in 2011. See ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, 
at 3-4. Vrignaud claimed his excessive use stemmed from his reliance on cloud-based 
storage. Id.; see also Ryan Singel, Comcast Bans Seattle Man from Internet for his Cloudy 
Ways, WIRED (July 13, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/07/seattle-
comcast/ (last visited July 25, 2013). After Vrignaud’s story received national attention, 
Comcast offered to restore his service, though he apparently declined the offer. See Dean 
Takahashi, Who Will Pick Up Paying Customer That Comcast Dropped Because of High 
Data Usage?, VENTUREBEAT (July 29, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/07/ 
29/who-will-pick-up-paying-customer-that-comcast-dropped-because-of-high-data-usage/ 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2013). 
32. In Beaumont, Texas, customers were offered a choice of 5, 10, 20, or 40 gigabytes 
monthly, with a fee for exceeding the cap. See Chloe Albanesius, Time Warner to Test 
Usage-Based System, PC MAGAZINE (Jan. 17, 2008, 5:39 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2250259,00.asp (last visited July 25, 2013). The 
company later marketed 100 gigabyte caps in New York and North Carolina. See Chloe 
Albanesius, Time Warner Scraps Bandwidth Cap Testing, PC MAGAZINE (April 16, 2009, 
3:35 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/ 0,2817,2345430,00.asp (last visited July 25, 
2013). 
33. See Jared Newman, AT&T’s U-Verse and DSL Data Caps: Good Deal, Bad 
Precedent, PC WORLD (March 14, 2011, 8:43 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
222039/atandts_uverse_and_dsl_data_caps_good_deal_bad_precedent.html (last visited 
July 25, 2013); Excessive Use Policy, CENTURYLINK, http://qwest.centurylink.com/ 
internethelp/eup.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2013). 
34. See Comcast Monthly Data Usage Threshold Suspension, COMCAST CORP., 
http://customer.comcast.com/help-and-support/internet/common-questions-excessive-use/ 
(last updated July 23, 2013). 
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consumption in 2012 was 51.3 gigabytes.35 Based on this figure, one could 
use almost six times more data than the average consumer before running 
afoul of Comcast’s 300-gigabyte limit. According to Netflix, streaming 
video typically consumes between 0.3 and 1.0 gigabytes per hour, while its 
high-definition (HD) content streams at 2.3 gigabytes per hour.36 To reach 
300 gigabytes, one would need to stream 130 hours of HD content in one 
month—or approximately two feature-length movies each day. 
Alternatively, one could stream between 300 and 1000 hours of non-HD 
content. Comcast notes that its previous 250-gigabyte data cap permitted a 
customer to send approximately 50 million emails or download 62,500 
songs each month.37 While it is not inconceivable that a customer would 
reach these totals, they far exceed the amount of content a typical 
subscriber consumes each month. Comcast and other providers have 
created online tracking tools to help consumers measure their monthly 
usage and determine how much data individual activities consume.38 
Other broadband providers have begun offering speed-based service 
tiers. Rather than paying for a fixed amount of gigabytes monthly, the 
customer chooses among different maximum download and upload rates.39  
For example, the basic Verizon FiOS broadband plan delivers customers 15 
megabits per second (Mbps) download and 5 Mbps.40 But customers can 
upgrade to premium plans offering between 50 and 500 Mbps download, 
and 25-100 Mbps upload.41 Some broadband providers offer unlimited 
monthly data at various speeds, while others offer plans that vary both 
maximum speed and monthly data limits.42  
                                                 
35. Sandvine 2012, supra note 3, at 6. While mean monthly data use is 51.3 gigabytes, 
median monthly data use is a much lower 16.8 gigabytes. Id. This implies that the mean is 
artificially inflated by heavier users and the median figure is more representative of the 
“average” household. Id. Nonetheless, to be cautious, this analysis uses the mean figure, 
particularly in light of the fact that per capita data consumption has likely increased since 
2012. Id. 
36. Netflix Lowers Data Usage By 2/3 for Members in Canada, NETFLIX (March 28, 
2011, 7:00 PM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/03/netflix-lowers-data-usage-by-23-for.html. 
37. Comcast Acceptable Use, supra note 25. 
38. See Comcast Monthly Data Usage Threshold Suspension, supra note 34. 
39 See, e.g., Michael Weinberg, Price Discrimination and Data Caps are Not the Same 
Thing, ALLTHINGSD, Apr. 8, 2013, available at http://allthingsd.com/20130408/price-
discrimination-and-data-caps-are-not-the-same-thing/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2013); Daniel A. 
Lyons, We Should Promote Broadband Pricing Innovation, COMPUTERWORLD, June 18, 
2013, available at 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9240126/We_should_promote_broadband_pricing
_innovation (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
40 http://www.verizon.com/home/fios-fastest-internet/fastest-internet-plans/ (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2013). 
41 Id. 
42 For example, in some markets Comcast offers several tiers of service at different 
speeds, but each tier is subject to a soft monthly data cap and an overage charge for 
exceeding the plan. See Teff Baumgartner, Comcast, TWC Try on Data Caps, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Aug. 5, 2013, 2013 WLNR 19139706; Frequently Asked Questions 
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C. Usage-Based Pricing for Wireless Broadband Service 
Like fixed broadband service, most wireless broadband providers 
initially offered flat-rate unlimited data plans. But the surprisingly strong 
surge in smartphone-driven mobile data demand prompted most wireless 
carriers to shift to data caps, primarily as a way to slow the growth rate of 
mobile broadband demand and allow network capacity to catch up.43 In 
2007, AT&T paid generously to be the exclusive carrier of Apple’s iPhone, 
at a time when the smartphone was in its infancy. While the agreement 
succeeded in drawing more smartphone customers to AT&T, these 
customers were generally tech-savvy users with significant data demands.44 
By some reports, the average iPhone user consumed ten times the 
bandwidth of a typical smartphone user.45 This concentration of heavy data 
users on the AT&T network led to much-publicized congestion in many 
urban areas, where smartphone users were concentrated. The company 
explained that forty percent of the network’s traffic was driven by just three 
percent of its smartphone users, forcing the company to examine strategies 
either to reduce iPhone customer data use or to compensate the company 
for the congestion that they caused.46 In December 2010, AT&T shifted to 
a three-tiered pricing plan, with limits at 200 megabytes, 2 gigabytes, and 4 
gigabytes, with a per-gigabyte overage charge.47 Verizon Wireless adopted 
similar caps the following year,48 and in mid-2012 both companies added a 
shared-data option, which allows customers to share their monthly data 
multiple devices.  
Other wireless carriers have embraced different methods of 
managing consumer data use. Like its competitors, T-Mobile also adopted 
                                                                                                                 
About our Data Usage Plans, http://customer.comcast.com/help-and-support/internet/data-
usage-what-are-the-different-plans-launching (last visited Aug. 15, 2013). 
43. See, e.g., Andrew M. Seybold, Wireless Network Congestion, ANDREWSEYBOLD 
(Feb 9, 2012), andrewseybold.com/2845-wireless-network-congestion. 
44. Brian X. Chen, AT&T Chief Regrets Offering Unlimited Data for iPhone, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 4, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/att-randall-
stephenson/. 
45. Sam Oliver, AT&T Caps New iPhone, iPad Data Plans at 2GB, Announces 
Tethering, APPLE INSIDER (June 2, 2010, 8:05 AM), http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/ 
10/06/02/att_announces_iphone_tethering_plans_caps_ipad_3g_data_at_2gb.html. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.  
48. Trefis Team, Verizon’s Stock Looks Full at $42 As It Readies to Scrap Unlimited 
Data Plans, FORBES (May 29, 2012, 10:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
greatspeculations/2012/05/29/verizons-stock-looks-full-at-42-as-it-readies-to-scrap-
unlimited-data-plans/. Verizon’s data caps came shortly after Apple made the iPhone 
available on Verizon’s network. Both AT&T and Verizon initially grandfathered in the 
unlimited flat-rate data plans for existing customers, although both sometimes throttle back 
the speeds of the top five percent of data users still enrolled in these unlimited plans. 
Verizon Wireless has further announced that these grandfathered customers must surrender 
their unlimited data plans if they wish to migrate from 3G to the company’s new LTE 
network, meaning many unlimited plans will be phased out over the next few years. Id. 
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a tiered pricing system for its customers in 2011.49 T-Mobile, however, 
does not assess an overage charge on customers who exceed the cap.50 
Instead, those customers see their speed reduced to 100 kilobytes per 
second for the rest of the month.51 Sprint offers unlimited data at a flat 
rate.52 But speed tests often place the Sprint network a distant third behind 
AT&T and Verizon in most major areas, which suggests that these 
unlimited plans may take a toll on network operations.53 
III. USAGE-BASED PRICING AS A COST RECOVERY TOOL 
At their core, data caps and other forms of usage-based pricing 
represent different pricing strategies through which a company can spread 
its costs over its customer base. Usage-based pricing allows broadband 
companies to shift more of their network costs onto those who use the 
network the most. This alternative pricing strategy may prove both more 
efficient for network providers and more attractive to consumers, 
particularly those who cannot afford an unlimited flat-rate plan.  
A. Distributional Effects of Flat-Rate and Metered Pricing 
Under a flat-rate pricing system, lighter users end up paying a 
disproportionate share of overall network costs. As the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) has noted, “[r]equiring all 
subscribers to pay the same amount for broadband service, regardless of the 
performance or usage of the service, would force lighter end users of the 
                                                 
49. Jagdish Rebello, Wireless Operators Prefer Tiered Pricing, Market Insight, IHS 
ELECTRONICS & MEDIA (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.isuppli.com/ mobile-and-wireless-
communications/marketwatch/pages/wireless-operators-prefer-tiered-pricing.aspx. T-
Mobile offers a premium tier with unlimited monthly data. 
50. See Danny Sullivan, In T-Mobile’s ‘Simple Choice’ Plan, ‘Unlimited’ Meets 
Limits, CNET (Mar. 26, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-33620_3-57576454-
278/in-t-mobiles-simple-choice-plan-unlimited-meets-limits/.  
51. See id. 
52. Sinead Carew, Sprint 4G Network Upgrade May Kill Unlimited Data Plan, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2011, 12:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2011/11/26/sprints-4g-network-unlimited-data-plan_n_1114084.html. 
53. See, e.g., David Goldman, Which iPhone Carrier is Best in Your City?, 
CNNMONEY (May 30, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/30/technology/ iphone-carrier-
compare/. PC Magazine notes that nationwide tests show Sprint’s 3G network is “the 
slowest of the major wireless providers,” with download speeds half of that on Verizon’s 3G 
network. Sascha Segan & Alex Colon, Exclusive: Testing Sprint’s New 4G LTE Network, 
PC MAGAZINE (June 18, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2405675,00.asp. 
The company is developing a 4G LTE network that will make the company more 
competitive. Id. The new network is projected to deliver maximum speeds slower than 
AT&T or Verizon, but is designed to manage traffic so as to deliver a consistent average 
speed during periods of high demand. Id.  
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network to subsidize heavier end users.”54 Heavier users consume more of 
the network’s total capacity than lighter users, yet light and heavy users 
contribute equally to cover the network’s costs. This means that lighter 
users pay a higher effective rate per megabyte than heavier users.  
To put the Commission’s concern another way, flat-rate pricing 
forces below-average users to purchase more broadband access than they 
use.55 Typically, the network owner will set a price that reflects the 
bandwidth consumed by the average user.56 This means that lighter users 
are charged as if they consume an average amount of data monthly, 
although by definition their actual usage is below that amount.57  
This disparity could discourage broadband adoption, and limit access 
to broadband services, particularly among poorer consumers. If lighter 
users are forced to purchase more broadband than they need, some lighter 
users may choose not to purchase access at the single flat rate, even though 
the benefits they receive would exceed the cost of providing service at their 
anticipated volume level.58 These consumers demand less from the Internet 
each month than the average user, and therefore may not place a high 
premium on unlimited access, though they may pay a lower rate for enough 
monthly data to meet their needs.  
These effects would be unremarkable if most consumers used 
roughly the same amount of data. Cross-subsidization is a trivial issue if 
there is little absolute difference in data consumption between below-
average and above-average users. In that instance, the amount of the 
subsidy would be small and might cancel out over time if individual users 
consume slightly below-average amounts of data in one month, and slightly 
above-average amounts in the next.  
But this turns out not to be the case. According to Sandvine’s Fall 
2012 report on network traffic, the heaviest one percent of downstream 
users account for 12.8% of total North American fixed downstream traffic, 
while the heaviest one percent of upstream users account for almost thirty-
nine percent of total upstream use.59 By comparison, the bottom half of 
broadband consumers account for only 5.2% of total North American fixed 
broadband traffic.60  
The gulf is vaster in the wireless market. Sandvine notes that median 
monthly mobile data consumption in North America is 32.9 megabytes.61 
                                                 
54. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Report & Order, FCC 
10-201, para. 72 (2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
FCC-10-201A1.pdf. 
55. Yoo, supra note 21, at 203. 
56. See id. 
57. Id.  
58. See id. 
59. Sandvine 2012, supra note 3, at 7. “Downstream” refers to the flow of information 
from the Internet to the consumer, while “upstream” refers to the flow of information from 
the consumer to another destination on the Internet. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 9. 
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But mean monthly consumption is almost ten times that figure, at 317.2 
megabytes.62 This means that a small number of heavy users are consuming 
significantly more data than the typical consumer.63 This surprising result 
stems from the fact that the mobile data market is bimodal, consisting of a 
large number of first-generation feature phones and an increasing number 
of first-time smartphone adopters, both of which use small amounts of data, 
in addition to a customer segment using more data-intensive smartphones 
and tablets.64 Therefore the mobile data network is dominated by a small, 
but increasing, number of heavy users. In fact, Sandvine estimates that the 
heaviest one percent of mobile data users consume 23.9% of upstream and 
18.7% of downstream mobile traffic.65 By comparison, the bottom half of 
all wireless data customers account for less than one percent of total 
network traffic.66 
Given the substantial disparity between heavy and light users, it is 
not surprising that some broadband providers are exploring alternative 
pricing regimes that would eliminate the cross-subsidy. Former 
Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski noted that usage-based pricing 
can “increase choice and competition, and it can increase fairness. It 
can . . . result in lower prices for people who consume less broadband, so 
experimentation in this area with those goals in mind is particularly 
appropriate.”67 Former Federal Trade Commission Chairman Jon 
Leibowitz, an antitrust lawyer who specialized in telecommunications 
issues, similarly supports usage-based pricing, noting that the practice 
would help fund future investment in network expansion and upgrades.68 
1. Simple Metered Pricing 
There are several usage-based pricing models that could shift more 
network costs onto heavier users. A simple metered pricing plan, which 
bills the consumer on a per-megabyte or per-gigabyte basis, would ensure 
that the amount each consumer pays for broadband access reflects the use 
each customer receives from the network. Like water utilities, broadband 
providers could set a higher per-unit rate on data consumption above a 
                                                 
62. Id. 
63. The mean is the average amount of data consumed per customer, and is calculated 
by dividing total data consumption by total number of customers. The median is the amount 
of data consumed by the customer at the midpoint of the range, meaning if you ranked all 
customers from least data to most data, an equal number of customers use less than the 
median and more than the median. The significant disparity between the mean and the 
median stems from the fact that the customers who use above-median amounts of data 
consume significantly more data. 
64. See id.; Sandvine 2011, supra note 3, at 10. 
65. Sandvine 2012, supra note 3, at 10.  
66. Id.  
67. Usage-Based Pricing Can Help Competition, Genachowski Says, COMM. DAILY, 
2012 WLNR 11103531 (May 23, 2012). 
68. Jonathan Make, Usage Based Billing Seen Being Introduced by U.S. Wireline 
ISPs, COMM. DAILY, 2012 WLNR 12561386 (June 21, 2011). 
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certain amount to recover an even greater proportion of costs from those 
who draw most upon the common bandwidth pool.  
But simple metered pricing might prove difficult to administer. First, 
the additional transaction costs of real-time tracking and billing at the 
customer-specific level may offset any revenue gains achieved by 
differential pricing.69 Christopher Yoo posits that high transaction costs 
may explain why the local telephone market never moved to per-minute 
pricing despite a strong case that such pricing would be more efficient and 
fairer to consumers.70 He suggests that similar dynamics could also 
undermine usage-based broadband pricing.71 Brett Frischmann and Barbara 
van Schewick have responded that in the broadband market, these 
transaction costs are probably much lower than Yoo hypothesizes, given 
that most consumers access the Internet through a single network 
gateway.72 They also note that many providers already offer an array of 
statistics on individual use by consumer.73 This is particularly true in the 
wireless industry, where both provider-operated and third-party 
applications give customers real-time information about data use and send 
warnings as data use approaches important thresholds.74  
Even if Frischmann and van Schewick are correct that tracking tools 
lower the transaction costs of simple metered pricing, investors may be 
wary of pricing strategies that cover significant fixed installment costs 
through purely volume-based rates. By definition, the fixed costs stay 
relatively constant, while variations in aggregate monthly consumption 
may leave the company without sufficient revenue to meet those costs. In 
that circumstance, the company may have to raise rates, which customers 
are unlikely to appreciate as a reward for their conservation. 
Simple metered pricing also might prove a challenge for consumers. 
Although many consumers could pay less under a metered system, Andrew 
Odlyzko stresses the importance of “mental transaction costs,” the cost to 
consumers of the mental effort required to sort out the many available 
choices in an increasingly complicated world.75 After facing choices all 
                                                 
69. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1847, 1868 (2006). 
70. See id.  
71. See id. 
72. Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Response to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 
J. 383, 394 (2007). 
73. See id.  
74. Verizon and AT&T each offer applications, known as My Verizon and myAT&T, 
respectively, that report a customer’s data use as measured by the company’s remote 
servers. Several third-party applications, such as 3G Watchdog, reports usage by tracking 
information as it flows through the device itself. See generally Ed Rhee, How to Track Data 
Usage on Your Android Phone, CNET (July 8, 2011, 2:15 PM), 
http://howto.cnet.com/8301-11310_39-20077775-285/how-to-track-data-usage-on-your-
android-phone/. 
75. Odlyzko credits Nick Szabo with originating the phrase, “mental transaction 
costs,” to describe the difficulty of implementing micropayment regimes. See ODLYZKO ET 
AL., supra note 10, at 72; Andrew Odlyzko, The History of Communications and its 
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day, consumers may simply find it fatiguing to have to decide whether 
downloading a movie in HD rather than standard definition is worth the 
additional bandwidth cost.76 Odlyzko also notes that unlimited use plans 
have an insurance effect: some customers may prefer to pay more for 
unlimited service in order to be protected from bill shock during a period of 
unusually high broadband usage (if, for example, a child unwittingly 
downloads significant quantities of data).77 Odlyzko argues that the 
decision fatigue and insurance effects likely explain the results of 1970s 
AT&T studies showing light-use local telephone customers preferred flat-
rate billing over per-minute billing, even though they would likely pay less 
under a metered regime.78 Similarly, in the late 1990s AT&T Worldnet 
dial-up customers typically moved from metered rates to a $19.95 flat rate 
for unlimited use when their metered rates approached $11-12/month.79 
These studies suggest that many consumers are willing to pay a premium to 
avoid having to make a cost-benefit analysis of each broadband transaction. 
2. Data Caps and Tiered Service Models 
Like simple metered service, data caps help broadband companies 
shift more network costs onto heavier users. All customers pay the same 
flat rate for service up to the cap, and heavier users pay an additional 
amount per unit for consumption beyond the cap. Like metered pricing, 
data caps help solve some of the inefficiencies of flat-rate service. The 
overage charge becomes a way to mitigate the cross-subsidy by recovering 
a greater portion of network costs from heavier users. Tiered service plans 
increase customer choice by offering consumers several different monthly 
data plans. Heavier users will choose a larger monthly data allotment, 
which is priced higher than the lower tiers purchased by lighter users. In 
that way, the price difference between large and small plans helps 
ameliorate the cross-subsidy by recovering more revenue from heavier 
users. 
Monthly data plans help ameliorate some of the stress that simple 
metering places on consumers. As noted above, many fixed wireless 
providers have adopted soft data caps set well above the average 
consumer’s monthly use. For most consumers, this data cap provides the 
same predictability of the flat-rate model and spares them the mental 
accounting costs of a strictly metered regime. Most consumers will receive 
peace of mind knowing that unless they dramatically increase their online 
activity, they will remain under the cap and can predict with certainty their 
                                                                                                                 
Implications for the Internet 7 (June 16, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
AT&T Research Labs), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/ 
history.communications0.pdf. 
76. See ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 44. 
77. See id. at 41 (describing the results of AT&T studies conducted in the 1970s). 
78. See id. at 44. 
79. See id. at 43. 
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monthly broadband costs. Of course, if a company adopts a single soft data 
cap for all customers, the company must monitor average use and adjust the 
cap periodically to assure that the cap remains well above the average 
user’s monthly consumption. Otherwise customers will begin to suffer 
from the mental fatigue that Odlyzko describes. 
Wireless data plans force consumers to think more carefully about 
their data consumption. As described above, many wireless providers offer 
several tiers of service, but even the largest tier of service is rarely 
sufficient for a customer to conduct all of his or her Internet activity 
wirelessly. This leads wireless broadband customers to conserve their 
wireless data use where possible, for example by using Wi-Fi to offload 
traffic from 3G and 4G networks to less congested fixed broadband 
networks. Of course, even under high fixed broadband data caps, heavier 
users must monitor their usage and evaluate the cost of activities that might 
push them over the cap. But if, as AT&T’s iPhone user data suggests, the 
network’s heaviest users are likely to be the most technologically savvy,80 
then this segment may better understand their data consumption patterns 
and may suffer less mental fatigue from calculating whether the additional 
megabyte consumption of an online activity is worth the price. 
B. Recovering Costs Through Price Discrimination 
1. Marginal and Fixed Broadband Costs 
Some commentators have questioned the notion that usage-based 
pricing helps broadband providers recover their costs more efficiently. 
They argue that it is a mistake to recover more network costs from heavier 
users because heavy users contribute little marginal cost to network 
operations.81 Odlyzko notes that statistical multiplexing allows multiple 
users to share the same bandwidth simultaneously, meaning that each 
additional user imposes only trivial marginal costs onto the network.82 
Although Odlyzko concedes that “determining the actual cost of using a 
broadband network is exceedingly difficult,”83 a New York Times editorial 
states that “moving an extra gigabyte of data at off-peak times costs 
virtually nothing.”84 Similarly, Netflix, which is responsible for almost a 
third of all peak-time downstream traffic and therefore sees data caps as a 
                                                 
80. INFORMA TELECOMS & MEDIA, UNDERSTANDING TODAY’S SMARTPHONE USER: 
DEMYSTIFYING DATA USAGE TRENDS ON CELLULAR & WI-FI NETWORKS 5 (2012), available 
at http://www.informatandm.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ Mobidia_final.pdf; see also 
supra text accompanying note 44. 
81. See Hibah Hussain et. al., Capped Internet: No Bargain for the American Public, 
NEW AMERICA FOUND. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/ 
capped_internet_no_bargain_for_the_american_public. 
82. ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
83. Id. at 19. 
84. To Cap, or Not: Broadband Limits Need to be Carefully Monitored to Promote 
Innovation and Competition, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at A20. 
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threat to business growth, claims that “the marginal cost of providing an 
extra gigabyte of data . . . is less than one cent, and falling.”85 As a result, 
Netflix general counsel David Hyman asserts that there is “no good reason 
for bandwidth caps and fees to take root.”86 For this reason, skeptics claim 
it is “entirely inaccurate” to suggest that average users subsidize heavier 
“bandwidth hogs.”87 Free Press, Public Knowledge, and other public 
interest groups have thus asked regulators and antitrust enforcers to 
investigate the industry’s use of data caps because the caps lack any 
“legitimate economic justification.”88 
As an initial matter, the call for additional oversight on these grounds 
seemingly reflects a misunderstanding of the role of regulation. Underlying 
this critique is the unstated premise that equitable cost distribution is the 
only presumptively “legitimate” broadband pricing strategy, and companies 
must justify to the regulator any deviation from this model. While an 
equality standard has an intuitive appeal,89 there is no reason to believe that 
it represents the only, or even the best, broadband pricing structure.  
Generally, when companies experiment with different pricing 
strategies, they can test potentially more efficient business models.90 If 
these new models prove less efficient, companies will abandon them. This 
experimentation brings consumers the benefits of increased competition 
and increased choices in the marketplace. Normally, the regulator should 
intervene only if the practice actually harms consumers and consumers 
cannot punish the practice because the company has market power.91 
Otherwise, companies should be presumptively permitted to experiment 
with alternative forms of cost recovery because experimentation helps the 
industry test potentially more efficient methods of operation. 
But setting aside this general objection, focusing on only the 
marginal cost of each gigabyte of capacity tells us little about efficient 
broadband pricing.92 It is true that, except during periods of congestion, the 
                                                 
85. David Hyman, Why Bandwidth Pricing is Anti-Competitive, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 
2011, 7:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702304447804576414220570134518.html. 
86. Id. 
87. ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
88. Letter from Free Press, supra note 10, at 2; see also Petition to Enforce Merger 
Conditions, supra note 12. 
89. See, e.g., Matthew Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer 
Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 583-85 (2006). Edwards 
notes an Annenberg Public Policy Center report that concludes consumers “overwhelmingly 
object” to differential pricing as “ethically wrong.” See id. at 585 (citing JOSEPH TUROW ET 
AL., OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICAN SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE 4 (2005), available 
at http://repository.upenn.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc_papers). 
90. See Edwards, supra note 89, at 586-91. 
91. See, e.g., Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982, 990 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (collecting sources). 
92. Scott Wallsten, Data Caps Aren’t Perfect, But That’s OK, ARS TECHNICA (May 
11, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/05/opinion-data-caps-arent-
perfect-but-thats-okay/. 
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marginal costs of additional bandwidth consumption are very small.93 But 
emphasizing marginal costs ignores the significant sunk costs required to 
build and maintain a broadband network. As Gregory Sidak explains, 
investors will fund these networks only if they can reasonably expect that 
the company will recover the costs of this investment, including a 
competitive return on capital.94 Marginal cost pricing is thus insufficient 
because it does not provide sufficient revenue to cover the network’s fixed 
costs.95 
In the broadband industry, those costs are significant. Broadband 
providers have invested over $300 billion in private capital in the past 
decade to build and upgrade the nation’s broadband networks.96 These 
investments include nearly $23 billion that Verizon has invested in FiOS, 
which boosts broadband speeds and capacity by replacing legacy copper 
telephone wire with higher-speed fiber optic cable in portions of its 
footprint.97 AT&T has also spent several billion dollars on fiber upgrades.98 
In the wireless sector, providers spent nearly $20 billion in 2008 to acquire 
spectrum when the 700 MHz block was freed up by the digital television 
transition, and are investing billions more to develop those assets into high-
speed LTE data networks.99 Of course, some broadband companies can 
recover these costs partly through voice and cable services that network 
upgrades also make available.100 But a recent FCC report suggests that “as 
                                                 
93. See Hyman, supra note 85. 
94. J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality 
Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 349, 357 (2006). 
95. Id.; see also Wallsten, supra note 92. 
96. CRAIG MOFFETT, U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CABLE & SATELLITE: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 6 (Bernstein Research) (Dec. 2010); see also Randolph J. May, Prices and 
Profits in the Broadband Marketplace, FREE STATE FOUND. (August 11, 2011, 1:50 PM), 
http://freestatefoundation.blogspot.com/2011/08/ prices-and-profits-in-broadband.html. The 
Columbia Institute for Tele-Information estimates that broadband providers invested $69 
billion in 2008 and $60 billion in 2009 alone, of which approximately half was attributable 
to broadband service (as opposed to other services that the companies provide). See Larry F. 
Darby & Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Innovation and National Broadband Policies: Facts, Fiction, 
and Unanswered Questions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 20 MEDIA L. & POL. 3, 11-12 
(2011).  
97. See MOFFETT, supra note 96, at 28. 
98. As Moffett notes, Verizon’s FiOS service provides fiber-optic cable to the 
consumer’s home. By comparison, AT&T’s U-Verse project provides fiber-optic cable to a 
neighborhood node, but relies upon legacy copper wire to transmit data from the node to 
individual homes. By avoiding the last-mile fiber drop, AT&T has spent much less per 
subscriber than Verizon. But Verizon’s network will deliver greater speeds and capacity as 
Internet demand continues to grow. As Moffett writes, “Verizon’s network is inarguably 
future-proof. AT&T’s is not.” Id. 
99. Eric Bangeman, 700 MHz Spectrum Auction Wraps Up, Tops $19.5 Billion, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 18, 2008, 5:57 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/03/ 
700mhz-spectrum-auction-wraps-up-tops-19-5-billion/. 
100. See ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 20-21. To the extent that these costs are 
directly attributable to other services alone (such as the cost of new set-top boxes for cable 
customers), they should be excluded from the broadband cost base. But much of these firms’ 
network investment consists of common costs: upgrades to the network that benefit both 
broadband and other services. There are many ways that these common costs can be 
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much as two-thirds of current investments are being made to provide and 
expand wired and wireless broadband” rather than voice or cable service, 
and “the trend over the past few years has been growing.”101 Moreover, as 
subscribership rates fall, telecommunications companies must look 
increasingly to broadband rates to recover these common costs.102 
Investment analyst Craig Moffett estimates that the return on these 
investments has been flat to negative over the past decade.103 He further 
warns that “[c]ompanies whose ROICs [Return on Investment Capital] fail 
to exceed their costs of capital or whose marginal ROICs are weak are 
likely to face stiff headwinds in the capital markets” and will be 
unattractive to investors going forward.104 
These fixed costs are not merely one-time investments. Rather, “sunk 
investment is made continuously over time” as firms continue to expand 
and upgrade their networks to meet rising demand.105 Cisco Systems 
anticipates that American IP traffic will triple between 2012 and 2017, 
representing a twenty-three percent compound annual growth rate.106 
Mobile data will grow at an even faster rate: Cisco estimates that mobile 
traffic will grow nine-fold by 2017, or fifty-six percent each year between 
now and then.107 This increase is driven by consumer demand for greater 
quantities of and more bandwidth-intensive Internet content and 
applications, such as streaming video and real-time teleconferencing.108 
According to Sandvine, real-time entertainment comprised fifty-nine 
percent of peak-time traffic on fixed networks, up from twenty-nine percent 
in 2009, and fifty percent of peak mobile traffic, up from eleven percent 
                                                                                                                 
allocated among the company’s services. As discussed below, Ramsey pricing suggests that 
a multiproduct firm should recover its common costs by raising prices on both products in a 
way that preserves the ratio of consumption that would occur if the rates were priced at 
marginal cost. This means raising prices more on price-inelastic services than on price-
elastic ones. See, e.g., William Baumol & David Bradford, Optimal Departures from 
Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265, 265-83 (1970); Frank Ramsey, A 
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 47-61 (1927). Elasticity estimates 
vary widely among studies, but it is quite possible that broadband service is more inelastic 
than cable or telephone service, given the wider range of services that broadband makes 
available. If this is true, then Ramsey pricing suggests much of these common costs should 
be recovered through broadband prices rather than cable or telephone rates.  
101. ROBERT C. ATKINSON & IVY E. SCHULTZ, BROADBAND IN AMERICA: WHERE IT IS 
AND WHERE IT IS GOING (ACCORDING TO BROADBAND PROVIDERS) 11 (2009) (prepared for 
FCC’s Omnibus Broadband Initiative). 
102. See, e.g., MOFFETT, supra note 96, at 11 (“Carriers have no choice but to invest in 
the network to keep it operational, and are allocating ‘growth capital’ to it by building-out 
expensive fiber infrastructures. At the same time, highly profitable traditional voice 
subscribers are fleeing in droves, leaving the network to support fewer operating profit 
dollars.”). 
103. See id. at 1. 
104. Id. at 12. 
105. Sidak, supra note 94, at 357. 
106. VNI Forecast Highlights, supra note 1 (click “Filter by Country”, click the United 
States, and click “2017 Forecast Highlights”). 
107. Id. (same instructions). 
108. Sandvine 2012, supra note 3, at 6, 9; Sandvine 2011, supra note 3, at 6. 
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only three years ago.109 As a result, analysts estimate that broadband 
providers must continue to invest $30 billion to $40 billion annually to 
expand and upgrade their networks to meet this growing demand.110 
2. The Potential Value of Price Discrimination 
For broadband providers and other industries with significant fixed 
costs, the challenge is therefore to design a pricing structure that spreads 
fixed costs intelligently across the company’s customer base. There are 
many possible ways that a company may do so, but there is no economic 
reason to believe that, because incremental marginal costs are small, fixed 
costs should be shared equally across all consumers. In fact, writes 
economist Scott Wallsten, “efficient pricing will, in general, charge users 
with high demand more than users with low demand even if those users 
impose no additional costs on the network.”111 This practice is known as 
“price discrimination.”112 
Price discrimination occurs when a company sells similar goods to 
different buyers based on their willingness to pay, rather than the cost of 
service.113 Or in economic terms, it is when a company’s sales exhibit 
different ratios of price to cost.114 Price discrimination stems from the 
recognition that different customers have different reservation prices, the 
maximum rate that a customer is willing to pay for a good or service.115 Its 
success depends first upon the firm’s ability to identify and charge more to 
those customers who have higher reservation prices, and second on 
customers’ inability to arbitrage the price difference. 
Although “price discrimination gets a bad name in part because it 
sounds sinister,”116 it is a fairly common practice throughout society 
(although sometimes it goes by the more benign term “customer 
segmentation”). Matthew Edwards notes that many movie theaters provide 
discounts to senior citizens and children, thus charging adult non-senior 
customers more for the same good.117 Publishers offer titles at different 
rates to consumers and institutional buyers, such as colleges and 
                                                 
109. Sandvine 2011, supra note 3, at 6, 10. 
110. See, e.g., May, supra note 96; ATKINSON & SCHULTZ, supra note 101, at 11. 
111. Wallsten, supra note 92. 
112 As Brett Frischmann notes, not all usage-based pricing may constitute price 
discrimination. To the extent that a company charges different rates in order to recover 
different customers’ congestion costs, the rate structure is better described as cost-based 
differential pricing.  See BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE 122 (2012).  
113. Edwards, supra note 89, at 562. 
114. Id.; see also Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of 
Price Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1235, 1239–40 (2010).  
115. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.1, at 4 (3d ed. 2005). 
116. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PHILIP J. WEISER, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., 
A “THIRD WAY” ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY 6 (May 30, 2006). 
117. See Edwards, supra note 89, at 563. 
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libraries.118 And a car dealership may sell the same model automobile to 
different customers at different prices, if one customer is better at haggling 
and a discount is needed to close the sale.119 Although each of these sellers 
is engaged in “discrimination,” these price differences are a legal and 
largely uncontroversial practice.120 Price discrimination can be lucrative for 
producers, because it allows them to increase revenue by charging higher 
prices to those who place a higher value on the product.  
The practice has more ambiguous effects on customers and total 
welfare, though antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp notes that “most 
price discrimination is socially beneficial.”121 Hovenkamp explains that the 
practice often “produces higher output and thus yields greater consumer 
benefits than forced nondiscriminatory pricing.”122 One oft-cited example is 
the airline industry, which exhibits a cost structure similar to broadband 
providers and where price discrimination occurs regularly.123 Assume, for 
example, that an airline’s average cost to transport a passenger on a full 
flight is $700. This amount would be sufficient to cover the passenger’s 
small marginal costs (primarily the in-flight meal) and a pro rata portion of 
the flight’s fixed costs (such as fuel, employee salaries, and the installment 
payment for the plane). The business traveler, racing to town for a meeting, 
may pay $1000 for her ticket, while the college student who is heading 
home may pay only $500 for the next seat over.124 The businessperson 
likely has a higher reservation price than the college student, because of the 
greater demands on her time. By charging the businessperson a higher 
price, the airline can secure from her a greater contribution to the airline’s 
fixed costs. This contribution allows the airline to offer a discounted ticket 
to the student.  
In this hypothetical, the ability to price discriminate allows the airline 
to serve more customers than under a flat-rate system. If the airline were 
instead forced to charge a single uniform rate of $700, the student and 
                                                 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 582; see, e.g., Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 231 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (finding no duty to disclose prices or avoid price discrimination between insured 
and uninsured purchasers of pharmaceuticals); Bonilla v. Volvo Car Corp., 150 F.3d 62, 71 
(1st Cir. 1998) (observing that “there is nothing in the law of fraud that prevents even a 
single seller from charging different markups in different markets so long as there is no 
affirmative misrepresentation”). As Professor Edwards notes, the Robinson-Patman Act 
prohibits price discrimination in certain commercial transactions of commodities, if the two 
buyers are competitors and the sale harms competition between them. Edwards, supra note 
89, at 577-78. But this act does not protect end-user consumers (who are not competitors), 
for good reason. Id. at 582-83. 
121. Id. at 588 (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2340c, at 139). 
122. Id.; see also Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation vs. Antitrust: How Net 
Neutrality is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1678 (2011) (“Although 
‘discrimination’ has a negative popular association, in economic theory, price discrimination 
may actually serve to increase consumer welfare.”) 
123. Wallsten, supra note 92; Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Net Neutrality, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 282 (2008). 
124. See Wallsten, supra note 92. 
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others with lower reservation prices would not be able to fly. Moreover, the 
airline might not be able to sell enough $700 tickets to fill the airplane, 
which would mean the uniform rate would have to be greater than $700 to 
cover the flight’s fixed costs.125 Of course, the airline could sell more 
tickets at a $500 rate, but this rate would fail to cover the airline’s fixed 
costs. If airlines were forbidden from engaging in price discrimination, 
many customers who currently receive discounted fares would have to pay 
more for airline tickets, and many would instead choose not to fly at all.126 
Price discrimination allows the airline to capture more revenue from those 
willing to pay more, while expanding service to customers with lower 
reservation prices. 
Of course, price discrimination works only if the company can 
successfully separate customers by reservation price. Ideally, a company 
would like to charge each customer exactly the maximum that the customer 
is willing to pay for the good—a scenario known as “first-degree price 
discrimination.”127 In reality, first-degree price discrimination is virtually 
impossible to achieve, so companies must devise strategies to segment the 
customer base in ways that successfully charge more to those willing to pay 
more.128 One way airlines distinguish business executives from students is 
by offering separate first-class and coach tickets. First-class fares include 
additional perks designed to appeal to executives, perks for which they are 
willing to pay extra but which do not add measurably to the marginal cost 
of service. Another way is to put restrictions on discount tickets that would 
discourage executives from buying. For example, requiring a twenty-one-
day advance purchase to receive the discounted rate drives executives 
toward a higher fare, since business trips are often scheduled at the last 
minute and cannot be predicted three weeks in advance.129 Similarly, 
offering the discount only in conjunction with a Saturday stay is an 
                                                 
125. In this hypothetical, one can assume that the airline cannot sell all its seats at a 
$700 rate. Otherwise, it would not have sold a $500 ticket to the student. 
126. ATKINSON & WEISER, supra note 116, at 282. 
127. Edwards, supra note 89, at 566-68. 
128 Economists divide imperfect price discrimination into two categories: second-degree 
price discrimination, where the price per unit varies based upon the quantity (or sometimes, 
the quality) of the good purchased, and third-degree price discrimination, where the price 
varies based on some identifiable characteristic of the consumer. See, e.g., FRISCHMANN, 
supra note 112, at 17. Usage-based pricing constitutes second-degree price discrimination, 
which Frischmann finds less problematic because it is more compatible with 
nondiscrimination norms that govern many networked industries: all consumers are 
presented with the same price schedule and the consumers themselves choose how much 
service to purchase. Id. at 122. To the extent that the network’s price schedule differentiates 
among customers, it does so only on a very general basis (such as charging residential 
customers and businesses different rates), which reflects differences in the cost to serve the 
group, differences in demand among groups, and group elasticity of demand. Id.  
129. Edwards, supra note 89, at 566-68. 
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inconvenience for business executives who would rather spend their 
weekends at home with their families.130  
3. Ramsey Pricing and Price Discrimination in 
the Broadband Industry 
In the broadband industry, as with many industries marked by high 
fixed costs, price discrimination based on customers’ willingness to pay is 
an efficient way to recover costs with minimal distortion to overall social 
welfare.131 This practice, familiar to many regulated industries, is known as 
“Ramsey pricing.”132 Ideally, a firm maximizes overall social welfare by 
pricing its goods at marginal cost: this ensures that the company serves 
every customer who values the good at or above the cost of producing it.133 
But as noted above, broadband providers cannot use marginal cost pricing 
because they need to recover fixed costs134 and fund future network 
investments. With Ramsey pricing, firms recover these fixed costs by 
raising prices more on those who are most willing to pay for the service, 
and less on those who would buy less (or not at all) if the price rose.135 Or 
in economic terms, the firm sets prices in inverse proportion to customers’ 
price elasticity of demand.136 In an ideal world, where the firm can 
perfectly separate each customer by his or her elasticity, Ramsey pricing 
would allow the firm to recover all of its costs while ensuring that few if 
any consumers who value the service at marginal cost will ever be priced 
out of the market.137  
Usage-based pricing strategies incorporate Ramsey pricing 
principles. By paying for consumption, consumers reveal how much they 
value broadband access. This form of price discrimination allows providers 
to recover more network costs from those whose consumption is least 
sensitive to changes in price. The extent to which the pricing strategy 
approximates Ramsey efficiency depends on the company’s ability to 
separate customers by willingness to pay. Simple per-unit metered pricing 
                                                 
130. Of course, firms can price discriminate for reasons other than finding customer 
reservation prices. For example, many airlines offer bereavement fares for families traveling 
to funerals, despite the fact that a funeral is an important event and the customer may have a 
high reservation price to get to the event on time. This form of humane price discrimination 
would also be impossible if airlines were required to charge a uniform flat rate per seat. 
131. Sidak, supra note 94, at 368. 
132. Id.; see also YOO, supra note 24, at 101-03. 
133. Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 9 (2002). 
134. Wallsten, supra note 92. 
135. Levine, supra note 133.  
136. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of 
Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 85  n.205 (2008); see 
generally Baumol & Bradford, supra note 100, at 267 (discussing the rules that determine 
whether a price-output combination is socially optimal); Ramsey, supra note 100, at 47-48, 
58-59 (discussing the relationship between price discrimination, revenue, and utility). 
137. Levine, supra note 133, at 9. 
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segments customers substantially, correlating each consumer’s total bill 
with the value that consumer receives from network use. If heavy users are 
highly price inelastic, a higher per-unit charge for consumption above a 
certain threshold may get even closer to Ramsey efficiency. By 
comparison, a data cap divides the customer base into only two groups 
(typical users, who do not exceed the cap, and heavy users, who do), but 
the overage charge allows the company to further segment the heavy user 
group based on the amount by which each customer exceeds the cap. 
Tiered data pricing lies somewhere between these two poles. By allowing 
customers to choose from an array of possible monthly limits, the provider 
can segment its customer base more finely than with a simple cap, though 
not as much as per-unit metering. The provider can experiment with 
different tiers and different rates per tier until it finds the pricing structure 
that best covers its fixed costs. 
Speed-based pricing strategies may similarly approximate Ramsey 
efficiency, although the customer segments differ somewhat from those 
revealed by monthly data plans.  Speed tiers segment the customer base by 
varying quality of service, while data tiers vary quantity of service. Speed 
tiers help broadband providers identify customers who use more advanced 
Internet applications, such as online gaming and video conferencing, which 
perform less-than-optimally at low speeds.138 But speed tiers alone cannot 
help differentiate the heavy gamer from the “sampler” of advanced 
services, such as the grandma who occasionally tries to video-chat with her 
grandchildren.139 On the other hand, data tiers lump together all who upload 
or download large quantities of material, which does not distinguish Netflix 
streamers from less sophisticated consumers who happen to use a nightly 
cloud-based backup service. By experimenting with different pricing plans, 
broadband providers can test the price elasticity of different customer 
segments, to discover through revealed preferences which price 
discrimination model is most efficient.  
Some view price discrimination skeptically because they assume the 
practice shows that the firm has market power.140 But as a unanimous 
Supreme Court recently recognized, “while price discrimination may 
provide evidence of market power . . . it is generally recognized that it also 
occurs in fully competitive markets.”141 The Court’s holding is consistent 
with more recent scholarship suggesting that price discrimination is often a 
byproduct of healthy competition among firms. William Baumol and 
Daniel Swanson have explained that competition compels firms to charge 
                                                 
138 See Lyons, supra note 39. 
139 Id. 
140. See, e.g., Gloria J. Hurdle & Henry B. McFarland, Criteria for Identifying Market 
Power: A Comment on Baumol and Swanson, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 693 (2003); Jonathan 
B. Baker, Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise of Market Power Without 
Anticompetitive Effects (Comment on Klein and Wiley), 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 643, 644 (2003) 
(“Price discrimination is properly understood as providing evidence of market power, as 
antitrust law has long recognized.”). 
141. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44-45 (2006). 
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lower prices to price sensitive consumers when possible.142 When 
companies have significant fixed costs, new firms can enter the market and 
customers can be segmented by demand.143 Companies must therefore 
resort to price discrimination or else they will fail to cover their costs.144 
Michael Levine similarly argues that in firms with high fixed costs, price 
discrimination will often be the dominant pricing strategy even in the 
absence of market power.145 Under these conditions, Baumol and Swanson 
argue, price discrimination may be inevitable and “firms may be able to 
indulge persistently in uniform pricing only if they possess the sort of 
monopoly power that forecloses such competition and enables them to 
obtain abundant earnings.”146  
4. Price Discrimination and Increasing 
Broadband Penetration Rates 
Usage-based pricing may also make entry-level broadband access 
more affordable.147 The FCC has stated that increasing broadband adoption 
rates is one of its biggest public policy challenges.148 While sixty-five 
percent of Americans have broadband access, those without access are 
generally “older, poorer, less educated, more likely to be a racial or ethnic 
minority, and more likely to have a disability” than those with broadband in 
the home.149 According to the Commission’s survey, those without 
broadband access cited cost as the primary barrier to adoption.150 A 2009 
report by Kevin Hassett and Robert Shapiro similarly concludes based 
upon several studies that “price is the strongest determinant of broadband 
                                                 
142. William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and Ubiquitous 
Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 674, 669-70 (2003); see also Sidak, supra note 94, at 367-68; see 
generally Joshua D. Wright, Missed Opportunities in Independent Ink, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 333, 339, 341, 348 (2006) (discussing competitive price discrimination). 
143. Baumol & Swanson, supra note 142, at 662. 
144. Id. 
145. See Levine, supra note 133, at 8. 
146. Baumol & Swanson, supra note 142, at 662. 
147. Cf. Sidak, supra note 94, at 367 (competition forces firms to lower the price they 
charge to price-sensitive consumers). 
148. FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 167 (2010) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN], available at http://download.broadband.gov/ 
plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf. 
149. Id. at 168. According to the Commission’s report, those over age sixty-five have a 
thirty-five percent adoption rate. The rate for low-income consumers (defined as having 
household income below $20,000 per year) is forty percent. For those without a high school 
diploma, the rate is twenty-four percent. Among African-Americans, the adoption rate is 
fifty-nine percent, while among Hispanic Americans the rate is forty-nine percent. Only 
forty-two percent of the disabled have broadband. Id. 
150. Id. at 168, 170. Thirty-six percent of respondents cited cost as the primary reason 
they do not have broadband access, followed by lack of digital literacy (twenty-two percent) 
and relevance (nineteen percent). 
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subscription.”151 After projecting broadband adoption rates under different 
pricing models, Hassett and Shapiro concluded that “spreading [broadband] 
costs equally among all consumers—the minority who use large amounts 
of bandwidth and the majority who use very little—will significantly slow 
the rate of adoption at the lower end of the income scale.”152 If broadband 
providers can shift more network costs onto heavier users, they can offer 
lower rates for light users. This practice benefits firms and consumers 
alike: it allows firms to capture more of the demand curve, offering service 
to more people who value the service above marginal cost, while at the 
same time it narrows the “digital divide” between those who can afford 
broadband access and those who cannot.153 
Of course, price discrimination only leads to higher adoption rates if 
broadband providers in fact reduce prices for lighter users. This appears to 
be the case. A 2010 study by Scott Wallsten and James Riso surveyed more 
than 25,000 broadband plans across several OECD countries.154 They found 
that residential broadband plans with data caps were, on average, about 
$164 less per year than similar but unlimited plans, while residential triple 
play plans (which combine broadband, voice, and video) were $152 less 
per year if they contain a data cap.155 As a result, Wallsten and Riso 
concluded that “many consumers, particularly the low-volume users, are 
likely to pay less for broadband with data caps than they would for plans 
offering unlimited data transfer.”156  
In the United States, Comcast has used pricing innovation to bring 
basic Internet access to low-income consumers. In 2011, the company 
introduced its “Internet Essentials” plan, which offers eligible consumers a 
low-speed-tier plan (5 Mbps download, 1 Mbps upload) for $9.95 per 
month.157 In its first two years, the company signed up 220,000 households, 
                                                 
151. KEVIN A. HASSETT & ROBERT J. SHAPIRO, TOWARDS UNIVERSAL BROADBAND: 
FLEXIBLE BROADBAND PRICING AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 4-5 (Aug. 2009) (Georgetown 
Center for Business and Public Policy), available at http://www.gcbpp.org/files/ 
Academic_Papers/AP_Hassett_Shapiro_Towards.pdf (citing, among other sources, PAUL 
RAPPOPORT ET AL., WILLINGNESS TO PAY AND THE DEMAND FOR BROADBAND SERVICE 
(2003), available at http://www.economics.smu.edu.sg/events/Paper/Rappoport_3.pdf; 
AUSTAN GOOLSBEE, THE VALUE OF BROADBAND AND THE DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF TAXING 
NEW TECHNOLOGY (2006), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/ 
austan.goolsbee/research/broadb.pdf; and JOHN HORRIGAN, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 
2009 (2009) (Pew Internet & American Life Project), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2009/Home-Broadband-Adoption-
2009.pdf). 
152. HASSETT & SHAPIRO, supra note 151, at 12.  
153. Id. 
154. SCOTT WALLSTEN & JAMES L. RISO, RESIDENTIAL AND BUSINESS BROADBAND 
PRICES PART 1: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF METERING AND OTHER PRICE DETERMINANTS 1 
(Nov. 2010) (Technology Policy Institute), available at http://techpolicyinstitute.org/ 
files/residential%20and%20business%20broadband%20prices%20pt1.pdf. 
155. Id. at 16. 
156. Id. at 3. 
157 See Comcast, 157 CableFAX Daily, Aug. 14, 2013, 2013 WLNR 20166462. The 
program also provides computers at subsidized rates and free digital literacy training. 
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or almost 900,000 consumers. This flexibility, in turn, likely helps boost 
broadband adoption rates. Because existing Comcast subscribers are 
ineligible, it is reasonable to assume that many Internet Essentials 
subscribers are households that did not previously have broadband access 
and could not afford, or otherwise chose not to purchase, more expensive 
plans with fewer limitations. 
One also sees some evidence that price discrimination helps reduce 
wireless broadband prices, though the record is mixed. In June 2010, 
AT&T eliminated its $30/month unlimited data plan for smartphone users. 
Instead, customers could choose a 200-megabyte plan for $15 per month or 
2 gigabytes for $25 per month.158 If a customer exceeded his or her data 
cap, the company charged $15 for each additional 200 megabytes on the 
smaller plan or $10 for each additional gigabyte under the larger plan.159 At 
the time of the change, sixty-five percent of AT&T customers used less 
than 200 megabytes of data each month, while ninety-eight percent used 
less than 2 gigabytes.160 This meant that the move from unlimited to tiered 
service was less expensive for most AT&T customers and made wireless 
broadband a more affordable option for consumers who found the $30 flat 
rate unacceptable.161 There were no comparable savings when Verizon 
Wireless phased out its $30/month unlimited data plan in June 2011, 
shortly after introducing the iPhone to its network. Henceforth, new 
Verizon customers could choose from three different tiers of service, the 
cheapest of which was 2 gigabytes per month at the same $30 rate as the 
old unlimited plan.162 
                                                                                                                 
Consumers are eligible if one member of the household is eligible to participate in the 
National School Lunch Program. See Internet Essentials, 
http://www.internetessentials.com/how-it-works (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). In markets 
where Comcast has monthly data limits, Internet Essentials customers are subject to the 
same restrictions as other residential subscribers. 
158. See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Announces New Lower-Priced Wireless Data 
Plans to Make Mobile Internet More Affordable to More People (June 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=17991&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=30854&mapcode=financial|mk-att-
blackberry-torch. 
159. Id. 
160. Id.  
161. See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Launches New Data Plans (Jan. 18, 2012), 
available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=22240&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=33672. The company raised its rates to 
$20/month for 300 megabytes, $30/month for 3 gigabytes, or $50/month for 5 gigabytes. 
This means that the 2012 entry-level price remains below the 2010 flat rate.  
162. See Cecilia Kang, Verizon Phasing Out Unlimited Mobile Data Plans, WASH. 
POST, June 23, 2011, at A15. 
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IV. USAGE-BASED PRICING AS A CONGESTION 
MANAGEMENT TOOL 
Usage-based pricing can also be a tool to compel more efficient 
network operation. If the price a customer pays for use reflects the cost that 
use imposes on the network, the customer is less likely to overuse the 
network. Usage-based pricing may also incentivize companies throughout 
the Internet ecosystem to adopt more efficient data-management practices. 
The extent to which usage-based pricing can help manage network 
congestion depends on the nature of congestion and the feasibility of 
structuring a pricing strategy that would correlate prices with congestion 
costs. 
A. Broadband Service and the Possibility of Congestion Costs 
As Christopher Yoo and others have noted, unlimited flat-rate pricing 
plans “tend to induce excessive levels of congestion.”163 This is because 
broadband service is an example of what economists call a “club good.”164 
A club good is one that exhibits some characteristics of a private good and 
some of a public good. Like a private good, a club good is excludable, 
meaning the owner can prevent consumers who have not paid from 
accessing the service.165 This distinguishes club goods from purely public 
goods (such as broadcast television) and common pool resources (like fish 
in a public lake). But club goods are also non-rivalrous, meaning that they 
can be shared by more than one person at the same time.166 This 
distinguishes them from typical private goods such as food or clothing. 
James Buchanan, the Nobel-prize-winning economist who devised the 
term, cited the community swimming pool as his primary example.167 Other 
economists have shown how the cinema, cable television, and many social 
organizations can be club goods.168 Broadband networks also fit the 
definition: the broadband provider may exclude consumers who have not 
                                                 
163. Yoo, supra note 21, at 204. 
164. See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1863-64 (describing broadband as a club good); 
William D. Rahm, Watching Over the Web: A Substantive Equality Regime for Broadband 
Applications, 24 YALE J. REG. 1, 18 (2007). 
165. See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1863 (citing James Buchanan, An Economic Theory of 
Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965) and RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 351-53 (2d ed. 1996)). 
166. Id. at 1863-64. 
167. Id.; see also Patrick McNutt, Public Goods and Club Goods, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 936 (1999). 
168. J. ANDREW HANSZ & DARREN K. HAYUNGA, CLUB GOOD INFLUENCE ON 
RESIDENTIAL TRANSACTION PRICES (Aug. 5, 2011), available at 
http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/jrer/papers/pdf/forth/accepted/Club%20Good%20Influen
ce%20on%20Residential%20Transaction%20Prices.pdf. 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 66 
 
30 
paid for the service, but multiple consumers can use the network 
simultaneously.169  
Because of these characteristics, club goods are affected by 
congestion costs, the marginal cost of additional network use. As implied 
by their name, congestion costs are the costs that one consumer’s use 
imposes on other consumers, which in the broadband industry can take the 
form of packet delays or packet loss.170 When the network is lightly loaded, 
congestion costs are “essentially zero.”171 But when the network is running 
near full capacity, the congestion costs created by an additional user can be 
substantial.172 
As Yoo has shown, unlimited flat-rate pricing can lead to 
overconsumption because consumers do not directly pay the congestion 
costs that they impose on the network.173 Ideally, a network provider would 
encourage each consumer to use the network as long as the benefit he or 
she gets from network use exceeds the cost of that use.174 But under a flat-
rate system, the consumer pays no additional cost for additional use, even 
when this consumption imposes congestion costs on society as a whole.175 
For example, a consumer may choose to watch a bandwidth-intensive 
movie or play interactive video games during peak times, even though this 
adversely affects the network’s overall operations. The consumer suffers 
some congestion cost (because the movie or game may suffer some 
congestion-related packet delays), but this cost is less than the congestion 
costs that the consumer’s decision imposes on all other network users.176  
A broadband provider can alleviate congestion in two ways: it can 
add network capacity or it can ration access.177 If congestion occurs 
regularly, the provider should invest capital to expand the network and 
                                                 
169. See sources cited supra note 151. 
170. When a broadband consumer requests Internet content from a server, the server 
breaks the content into a series of small packets, each of which travels across the Internet to 
the consumer. Once it arrives, the consumer’s computer reassembles the packets into a 
message. Congestion occurs when more packets seek to pass through a particular bottleneck 
than that bottleneck can handle. This surge in demand forces the network to queue the 
packets, which can cause packet delay. If the queue gets too long, the network may simply 
delete some packets entirely, which creates packet loss. Generally speaking, packet delay 
and packet loss are more perceptible for consumers using real-time applications such as 
streaming video and video conferencing, because the consumer experience depends upon a 
continuous flow of packets at a relatively steady rate. See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1861-62. 
171. ANDREA GRABER, INTERNET PRICING: ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO TRANSPORT 
SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE 33 (2005). 
172. See id. As noted above, congestion thus increases the marginal cost of serving a 
broadband consumer. See supra Part II.B.1. 
173. See Yoo, supra note 21, at 204-05. 
174. See id. 
175. See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1864. It is worth noting, however, that providers of 
some club goods can rely on flat-rate pricing because many customers choose to consume 
only small amounts of club resources despite the fact that additional consumption is 
costless. Gym memberships are one notorious example. Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike 
Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 695 (2006). 
176. GRABER, supra note 171, at 2-3, 34; Yoo, supra note 69, at 1864. 
177. GRABER, supra note 171, at 1-2. 
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provide more bandwidth to all users. But if congestion occurs only 
infrequently, expansion may be an inefficient solution, because it leads to 
significant expenditures for additional capacity that lies dormant most of 
the time. In this situation, rationing may be a better solution because it 
encourages consumers and network owners to manage existing capacity 
more efficiently. And the two are not mutually exclusive solutions: a 
provider may find rationing sufficient to address present congestion, but as 
consumers adopt increasingly intensive applications (such as streaming 4K 
Ultra HD video or telemedicine), the increased frequency with which 
congestion occurs may require the company to install additional capacity. 
If done correctly, usage-based pricing can alleviate congestion by 
discouraging bandwidth overconsumption. A per-unit pricing strategy 
forces each consumer to internalize the congestion costs that marginal 
consumption imposes on others.178 Ideally, the per-unit price would 
fluctuate to reflect the precise congestion cost of additional use at that time, 
though transaction costs may prohibit pricing at that level of precision.179 
By bringing a consumer’s private costs into line with the overall social 
costs of additional use, usage-based pricing encourages a consumer to 
consume additional resources only if his or her benefit exceeds the total 
cost. Usage-based pricing thus can temper the activities of “bandwidth 
hogs” whose heavy consumption could impose substantial congestion costs 
on their neighbors.  
Usage-based pricing also forces Internet content and application 
providers to be more efficient when sending content to consumers. Because 
consumers pay based upon bandwidth consumed, they demand that content 
and application providers deliver their services using as little bandwidth as 
possible. These consumer demands can encourage greater use of zipped 
files and other forms of compression, which leads to greater overall 
efficiency in network use. For example, Odlyzko notes that when Canada 
adopted usage-based pricing in 2011, Netflix responded by offering two 
tiers of service: a high-quality, heavy-bandwidth streaming service, or a 
low-quality alternative that consumes two-thirds less bandwidth.180 
Finally, usage-based pricing can force broadband providers to 
operate more efficient networks. If a broadband company is paid by 
volume of traffic that passes through its system, it will manage traffic 
where possible to maximize that volume. As volume rises, the increased 
congestion signals to the broadband provider the need for additional 
capacity. But importantly, under usage-based pricing, the increased volume 
that generates the congestion also helps fund the network expansion.  
                                                 
178. See Yoo, supra note 69, at 1874; ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 14. 
179. See, e.g., ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 55 (“Data sent or received during 
peak hours could be charged at rates that reasonably reflected their impact on network 
congestion. This practice could encourage users to manage their network usage more 
efficiently and reduce congestion generally.”). 
180. Id. at 14 (citing Netflix Lowers Data Usage by 2/3 for Members in Canada, 
NETFLIX (Mar. 28, 2011), http:// blog.netflix.com/2011/03/netflix-lowers-data-usage-by-23-
for.html). 
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Some critics argue that usage-based pricing may encourage 
broadband providers to restrict capacity, thus creating artificial scarcity that 
allows the company to raise rates without investing in network 
expansion.181 But this critique seems misplaced. A provider could create 
artificial scarcity only if it has market power, meaning it is insulated from 
competition. Otherwise, when a provider subjects customers to artificially 
high levels of congestion or low monthly limits, consumers will flee to 
another provider that is investing in its network to better meet demand.  
But if a firm has market power, it may avoid additional capital 
investment whether it uses flat rates or usage-based rates. A monopolist 
charging usage-based rates may lower its data cap and use overage charges 
to pad its bottom line. But a monopolist offering flat rates may exploit this 
power by increasing the rate for unlimited service and pocketing, rather 
than reinvesting, the added revenue. The difference is that under usage-
based rates, consumers make efficient use of the limited capacity available. 
In a capacity-constricted flat rate system, congestion rises until the only 
people using the network are those who can best tolerate lengthy service 
delays. This is what Jeffrey MacKie-Mason and Hal Varian call the “Yogi 
Berra equilibrium:” the point where the network is “so crowded that no one 
goes there anymore.”182 Thus while firms may have incentives to pad 
profits by restricting capacity, their ability to do so depends much more on 
their market power than their choice of pricing strategy.  
Whether usage-based pricing can be a useful tool to manage 
broadband congestion turns on two subsidiary inquiries. First, how 
congested are broadband networks? And second, how easily can usage-
based pricing target and alleviate that congestion?  
B. Measuring Broadband Congestion 
Although congestion is difficult to measure with certainty, and 
performance varies by network provider, many analysts have concluded 
that congestion is not presently a significant problem for fixed broadband 
networks.183 The FCC’s most recent survey of fixed broadband 
performance, released in July 2012, shows that the average fixed 
broadband provider delivered ninety-six percent of its advertised speeds 
during peak usage periods.184 This was up from eighty-seven percent in 
2011.185 The Commission attributes this improvement to “improvements in 
                                                 
181. See, e.g., ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 56. 
182. Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Hal R. Varian, Pricing Congestible Network 
Resources, 13 IEEE J. OF SELECTED AREAS OF COMM. 1141, 1146 (1995), quoted in 
GRABER, supra note 171, at 137. 
183. See Letter from Free Press, supra note 10, at 1. 
184. FCC, 2012 MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA JULY REPORT: A REPORT ON 
CONSUMER WIRELINE BROADBAND PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S. 10 (2012). Peak time is 
defined as weeknights from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. local time, when aggregate network 
demand is typically highest. Id. at 8. 
185. Id. at 10. 
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network performance” rather than downward adjustment on advertised 
speeds, noting that there was a thirty-eight percent increase in average 
speeds delivered to customers.186 Peak-time performance varies somewhat 
based upon technology. During peak periods, fiber-based networks such as 
FiOS delivered 117% of advertised download speeds, while cable-based 
services delivered ninety-nine percent of advertised speeds and DSL-based 
services lagged behind, at just eighty-four percent of advertised speeds.187 
Of course, this does not suggest that congestion is never a problem 
for fixed broadband networks. In 2008, the Commission sanctioned 
Comcast Corporation for throttling traffic between users operating peer-to-
peer networks.188 Comcast claimed throttling was necessary because these 
networks created an unexpected spike in demand for upload bandwidth, 
which imposed congestion costs on other consumers who shared upload 
bandwidth with someone operating a peer-to-peer network.189 One can also 
infer some level of network congestion from the rise of the Content 
Delivery Network (“CDN”) industry. Significant content providers such as 
Netflix rely on third-party CDNs such as Akamai and Level 3 Technologies 
to deliver their services.190 CDNs store multiple copies of a content 
provider’s data in locations across the country, and carry that data over 
their privately owned networks rather than the public Internet to a location 
on the broadband provider’s network closest to the consumer. One 
advantage that CDNs offer to content providers is the ability to avoid 
potential congestion costs associated with the bottlenecks of the public 
Internet. More generally, Say’s Law suggests that any installed capacity 
will eventually become saturated: greater network capacity drives greater 
demand for bandwidth-intensive applications that the additional capacity 
makes possible.191 This suggests that congestion may be managed or 
brought into equilibrium for a time, but supports the idea that congestion 
can be a legitimate factor in pricing determinations for broadband 
providers. 
Congestion is a much more significant issue for wireless providers.192 
As former FCC Chairman Genachowski and many commentators note, the 
smartphone revolution has unleashed tremendous demand for wireless 
applications and services. While wireless providers are investing billions of 
dollars to upgrade and expand network capacity, neither these efforts nor 
                                                 
186. Id. at 5-6. 
187. Id. at 10-11 (Peak-time upload speeds were 106% of advertised for fiber, 110% 
for cable, and 103% for DSL).  
188. See Formal Complaint of Free Press, supra note 25, at 13031. 
189. Id. at 13031-32. The Commission assumed without deciding that Comcast’s 
factual claims were true and found targeted throttling of peer-to-peer traffic was an 
unreasonable method of alleviating network congestion. Id. at 13056. 
190. See ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 23-24. 
191. See GRABER, supra note 171, at 6. 
192. See ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 21. 
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spectrum policy has been able to match that demand.193 Industry analyst 
Peter Rysavy notes that the bandwidth-intensive mobile applications such 
as streaming video are “growing tremendously, and it’s unclear how long 
operators will be able to keep up. In the absence of new spectrum, which 
does not seem to be materializing fast enough . . . the result will be 
networks running at capacity.”194 Given these dynamics, Rysavy concludes, 
“congestion is unavoidable.”195 This is reflected in the prevalence of tiered 
pricing in the wireless industry. 
C. Usage-Based Pricing as a Congestion Management Tool 
Although usage-based pricing encourages more efficient network 
consumption generally, many question its usefulness for alleviating 
congestion specifically. While data caps and tiered pricing have become 
prominent usage-based pricing strategies in the marketplace,196 they are 
rather crude tools for addressing network congestion.197 Data caps limit the 
amount of bandwidth that a customer uses each month. While this limit 
reduces overall traffic on the network, it does not directly target traffic 
during congestion periods. This is the equivalent of trying to solve rush-
hour highway congestion by placing a limit on the number of miles each 
driver can drive each month. The cap may have some indirect effect on 
congestion, if heavy users choose to reduce consumption by reducing peak-
time use. But the cap also targets heavy users who generate huge volumes 
of traffic during off-peak periods (for example, by backing up systems at 
2:00 a.m.), whose uses generate virtually no congestion costs.198 For this 
reason, Sandvine estimates that “monthly usage quotas have only a limited 
impact, if any at all, on peak network demand.”199  
If feasible, peak-time pricing could be a more effective usage-based 
strategy to alleviate congestion.200 When facing rush-hour traffic 
congestion, London famously began charging commuters a fee to drive in 
the busiest part of town during peak times. This strategy has reduced 
                                                 
193. See, e.g., Interview by NCTA with Julius Genachowski, former Chairman, FCC, 
(2012); Joe Zeto, Addressing Mobile Data Growth & Impending Network Congestion, 
WIRELESS WEEK (Feb. 7, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.wirelessweek.com/articles/2012/02/ 
technology-addressing-mobile-data-growth-impending-network-congestion-wireless-
networks/. 
194. PETER RYSAVY, INFORMATIONWEEK REPORTS, LTE: HUGE TECHNOLOGY, HUGE 
CHALLENGES 8 (Mar. 2012), http://www.rysavy.com/ Articles/2012_03_LTE.pdf. 
195. PETER RYSAVY, RYSAVY RESEARCH, MOBILE BROADBAND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS 
AND THE NEED FOR OPTIMIZATION 5 (Feb. 2010); see also Rysavy, supra note 194, at 8. 
196. See supra Section I.A–B. 
197. ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 28; Wallsten, supra note 92. 
198. GRABER, supra note 171, at 84. 
199. Sandvine 2011, supra note 3, at 5; see YOO, supra note 24, at 97-98. 
200. GRABER, supra note 171, at 86-100; Wallsten, supra note 19, at 2; but see YOO, 
supra note 24, at 99 (noting that even peak-time pricing “mimics congestion-based pricing 
imperfectly” and will still “result in a degree of inefficiency”). 
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congestion by thirty percent.201 For many years, peak pricing was a staple 
of long-distance and wireless telephone service in order to drive traffic 
toward nights and weekends when networks were less congested.202 In 
broadband, a metered rate that charges customers more for peak-time use 
might similarly encourage customers to shift peak-time activities to less 
expensive off-peak hours.203  
But it may be difficult to identify predictable periods of congestion 
and communicate that clearly to consumers. This may be possible for fixed 
broadband. Although the consensus is not universal, most analysts 
generally agree with the FCC that fixed broadband networks experience 
consistent peaks on weekdays between 7:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., which 
coincides with the time that consumers return home from work and 
consume bandwidth-heavy applications such as streaming video.204 As a 
result, a primetime premium may be a feasible solution to alleviate future 
fixed broadband congestion, assuming traffic patterns do not change as 
network use rises. But there is much less consensus regarding wireless 
congestion periods. Wireless customers vary widely in their data 
consumption habits. Network optimization company Bytemobile notes that, 
with the rise of wireless video, “mobile networks are under constant strain 
for the majority of the day.”205 Systems can monitor network load and 
automatically raise prices when they detect congestion. However, unless 
these periods are easily understood and predicted by consumers, they are 
unlikely to affect consumer behavior.206  
V.   POTENTIAL ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF USAGE-BASED 
PRICING 
While there are many potential benefits that flow from usage-based 
pricing, some critics do not trust the practice because of a fear of 
anticompetitive harm. These commentators fear that broadband providers 
may adopt data caps to achieve an unfair economic advantage in the video 
market. They note that “in the United States Internet service providers are 
almost always also in the pay-television business,” which competes against 
                                                 
201. See Sam Schwartz et al., A Comprehensive Transportation Policy for the 21st 
Century: A Case Study of Congestion Pricing in New York City, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 580, 
596-97 (2008-2009) (discussing London and Stockholm examples); but see Michael H. 
Schuitema, Comment, Road Pricing as a Solution to the Harms of Traffic Congestion, 34 
TRANSP. L.J. 81, 92-112 (2007) (noting distributional and other problems with congestion-
based pricing of traffic).  
202. See supra Section I.A. 
203. See Sandvine 2011, supra note 3, at 5. 
204. See FCC, supra note 184, at 8.  
205. BYTEMOBILE, MOBILE ANALYTICS REPORT 3 (June 2011). 
206. Odlyzko notes that even simple, relatively clear time-of-day pricing in other 
industries often fails to measurably change consumer behavior. ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 
10, at 28-29. 
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Internet-based video providers such as Netflix and Hulu.207 Comcast 
estimates that the amount of data required to replace its cable service with 
an Internet-based competitor would be 288 gigabytes each month208—a 
figure suspiciously close to Comcast’s 300-gigabyte monthly cap. Given 
the incentive to discriminate, critics allege that data caps serve primarily 
“to protect [broadband providers’] legacy, linear video distribution models 
from emerging online video competition.”209 
A. Data Caps as a Vertical Restraint on Trade 
These are valid concerns, although they come with some caveats. For 
many consumers, over-the-top video providers like Netflix are 
complements rather than substitutes to traditional cable: they offer an 
alternative slate of entertainment choices but do not replicate the specific 
channels and programs that cable offers. Cable industry analyst James 
Ratcliffe explains that subscription rates remain high because “pay TV 
continues to provide customers with the content they want, a lot of which 
isn't available outside the traditional pay environment,” such as live 
sporting events.210 Moreover, many broadband providers (particularly DSL 
and wireless providers) do not deliver cable service, and not all who do 
(like Verizon) have adopted data caps. Nonetheless, the Commission has 
correctly found that vertically integrated broadband providers “have 
incentives to interfere with the operation of” Internet-based competitors.211 
These integrated companies wish to keep as many customers as possible 
enrolled in the “triple-play” bundle of voice, video, and data service, 
because it increases overall revenues, spreads the common costs of the 
                                                 
207. Id. at 48. 
208 See App’ns of Comcast Corp., Gen. Electric Co., & NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent 
to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, Opposition to Petitions to Deny and 
Response to Comments, FCC MB Docket No. 10-56, at 93 (fil. July 21, 2010). 
209. Letter from Free Press, supra note 10, at 2. 
210. James Ratcliffe, Why Cable is Winning the Cord-Cutting War, HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER (Aug. 24, 2012, 6:00 AM),  http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/cable-TV-
netflix-hulu-youtube-hbo-time-warner-362784. Of course, some of the content Ratcliffe 
touts can be downloaded illegally online. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Team USA Deserves 
No Gold Medals for Internet Access, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-05/team-usa-deserves-no-gold-medals-for-
internet-access.html (discussing file-sharing site Pirate Bay’s circumvention of NBC’s time-
shifted Olympics coverage by hosting user-uploaded video of Olympic events). Moreover, 
popular cable providers such as HBO and ESPN are experimenting with web-based 
alternative delivery systems, and Intel seeks to enter the market as an Internet-based cable 
competitor, whose offerings would be a substitute for, rather than a complement to, 
traditional cable. See, e.g., Cliff Edwards, Intel Confident of Obtaining Programs for Web 
TV Service, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
06-25/intel-confident-it-will-obtain-programs-for-internet-tv-service.html (last visited Aug. 
2 2013). 
211. Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, Report and Order, 
FCC 10-201, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17916 (2010) [hereinafter Preserving the Open Internet 
Report and Order]. 
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network more widely, and can thus minimize the cost of each network 
service.  
But regulatory intervention requires more than a showing that a 
vertically integrated firm has incentives to take actions that might harm 
competitors. The firm must also have the ability to do so. Antitrust law 
subjects almost all vertical restraints to the rule of reason, which makes 
these restraints actionable only if the firm has market power.212 Without 
market power, a firm cannot maintain anticompetitive conduct, because 
customers will defect. If consumers in a competitive market wish to use 
Netflix and find that one company’s data caps prevent them from doing so, 
those consumers will move to another broadband provider.213 If no provider 
offers uncapped service and consumers demand it, over time one provider 
may change its policies to meet this pent-up demand. 
Although analysts dispute the precise level of competition in fixed 
broadband markets,214 Gregory Sidak and David Teece are probably correct 
that “the market for broadband access is both highly rivalrous and 
workably (even if not perfectly) competitive.”215 The Commission notes 
that eighty-two percent of American census tracts have at least two 
competitive options for fixed broadband service.216 Of course, in most 
places this means only two options: the telephone company and the cable 
company. Susan Crawford notes that because of cable’s recent upgrade to 
DOCSIS 3.0, a new standard that boosts performance of cable-based data 
transmission, cable companies offer speeds far greater than copper-based 
DSL service.217 Alfred Kahn, the late dean of regulated utilities law, has 
                                                 
212. See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881 
(2007). Technically, tying (which is a form of vertical inter-brand restraint) remains a per se 
offense, meaning a defendant can be held liable even without a finding of market power. 
But as Hanno Kaiser notes, this is somewhat of a distinction without a difference, as one 
element of a tying claim is that the defendant have market power in the tying market. See 
Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem? 7 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 91, 99-
101 (2011).  
213. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 401 (2009) (emphasizing the 
appropriateness of a market power requirement in analyzing vertical restraints); cf. Jeffrey 
Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims Against Internet Platforms: A Reasonable Framework 
for Initial Scrutiny, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537, 543 (2011) (discussing role of market power 
in claims against closed Internet platforms such as Apple’s App Store). 
214. See, e.g., ODLYZKO ET AL., supra note 10, at 32-33 (noting estimates about fixed 
broadband concentration and difficulty of entry). 
215. J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Innovation Spillovers and the “Dirt Road” 
Fallacy: The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Banning Optimal Transactions for Enhanced 
Delivery over the Internet, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 521, 526 (2010). Sidak and Teece cite 
several studies filed before the FCC in the net neutrality proceeding, including filings from 
Michael and one from Gary Becker and Dennis Carlton. See id. at 526 n.33. 
216. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 148, at 37. The Commission notes that it 
lacks the granularity of price and performance data needed to determine if two providers 
compete head-to-head throughout each census tract. Id.  
217. Susan P. Crawford, The Looming Cable Monopoly, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 34, 
36 (2010). Crawford notes that competition remains more robust where cable companies 
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explained that “[t]here is no consensus among economists about the likely 
sufficiency of competition under duopoly.”218 But as Sidak and Teece 
show, some providers experience annualized churn rates between 28.8% 
and 36%, which suggests that a sizeable number of customers do change 
broadband providers each year.219 And providers are competing in ways 
that are reducing switching costs. AT&T adopted a no-term service 
contract option in 2008, advertising it as service “without the hassle of a 
term commitment like those of cable companies.”220 Most of the industry 
quickly followed suit. The cable industry’s deployment of DOCSIS 3.0 
also evinces a desire to gain a competitive edge over Verizon and AT&T, 
which might not have happened if the companies had market power and 
thus felt no need to respond to telephone-based competition.  
Competition will increase as other platforms become more suitable 
substitutes for wireline broadband service, just as satellite rose as an 
intermodal competitor to traditional cable service. With the advent of 4G 
LTE speeds, many services available over fixed broadband networks are 
also available over wireless broadband as well; the gating factor is the 
capacity of wireless networks to offer these services at the same scale as 
today’s cable and telephone companies. And the FCC’s most recent 
broadband report notes that “the satellite industry began launching a new 
generation of satellites offering performance as much as 100 times superior 
to the previous generation,” offering speeds that “will support many types 
of popular broadband services and applications.”221 This means that 
satellite-based broadband is, or may soon be, available throughout the 
country as an alternative to telephone or cable-based broadband service. 
Opponents must also show that data caps harm consumers. Netflix 
can argue, and has argued, that data caps are a threat to its existing business 
model.222 But the Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded litigants that the 
antitrust laws were passed for “the protection of competition, not 
competitors.”223 Like price discrimination, vertical restraints have 
ambiguous effects on consumer welfare.224 Some vertical restraints “give 
rise to competitive foreclosure concerns,” but most are procompetitive 
because they “generate significant efficiencies and enhance consumer 
                                                                                                                 
compete with fiber-based telephone networks such as Verizon’s FiOS service. But Verizon 
has no immediate plans to expand the present FiOS service footprint. 
218. ALFRED E. KAHN, FTC WORKSHOP ON BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION 
POLICY (last updated Feb. 21, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/ 
workshops/broadband/presentations/kahn.pdf. 
219. Sidak & Teece, supra note 215, at 564-65. 
220. Press Release, AT&T, Two Years, One Price, No Term Contract: AT&T 
Introduces New Broadband Plans with Guaranteed Monthly Rate (Aug. 20, 2008), available 
at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=26024. 
221. FCC, 2013 MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA FEBRUARY REPORT 7 (2013). 
222. See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 85. Hyman is general counsel for Netflix. 
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welfare.”225 For example, when AT&T entered into an exclusive vertical 
agreement with Apple to distribute the iPhone, the wireless provider 
received a competitive advantage over Verizon and other competitors.226 
But this was undeniably good for consumers: it woke up a sleepy 
smartphone market, as AT&T advertised the product for which it paid so 
dearly, and Verizon began working with Google to develop the rival 
Android platform as a competitive alternative. 
As discussed above, broadband operators can offer several 
procompetitive justifications for data caps. Caps allow firms to shift more 
network costs onto heavier users, which can expand service to light users 
who cannot afford the higher uniform flat rate.227 They also encourage 
consumers, content providers, and broadband providers themselves to use 
network resources more efficiently.228 As critics point out, caps could also 
deter customers from canceling cable service in favor of Internet-based 
video options. This is harmful to that subset of consumers who subscribe to 
both broadband and cable and would cancel cable but for the data cap. But 
it could benefit those customers who subscribe only to broadband service: 
because cable and broadband service share common network costs, a 
shrinking base of cable subscribers would force the company to recover 
those costs by raising broadband rates.229 The net effect of the practice is 
difficult to determine with certainty, meaning that the anticompetitive case 
is not as simple or obvious as some critics assert. 
Perhaps for this reason, several antitrust scholars have surmised that 
the Department of Justice is unlikely to find that data caps are 
anticompetitive. Harry First notes that “[a]ll these cable companies are 
really facing big competition from the telcos” and “[i]f the consumer can 
just switch, then it’s not exclusionary and bad business.”230 Similarly, 
Herbert Hovenkamp notes that “[i]f it’s simply data caps . . . that’s a 
tougher antitrust case to make because public utilities have a legitimate 
interest in preventing overuse of their assets, particularly if other people’s 
access is being limited as a result. . . . There’s a legitimate claim on the part 
of the Internet providers that staged pricing or caps are reasonable.”231 First 
further explained that the agency’s case likely depends on whether it can 
find evidence of collusion among broadband providers: “[i]f they make 
these decisions unilaterally about how they’re going to price downloading 
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from the Internet individually, that’s not going to exclude these Internet 
rivals.”232 These comments echo the conclusions of a 2007 Federal Trade 
Commission study, which found that it is “difficult to find evidence that 
vertical controls reduce welfare” and that “optimal policy places a heavy 
burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive.”233 
This analysis highlights the importance of case-by-case adjudication 
of allegedly anticompetitive conduct. One cannot say as a general matter 
that data caps and other forms of usage-based pricing are inherently 
anticompetitive. The effect they have on competition turns upon a fact-
sensitive inquiry into the broadband provider’s market power, and 
quantification of the impact that the pricing strategy has on different 
segments of the provider’s customer base.  
B. The Xfinity-Xbox Dispute 
First and Hovenkamp suggested that the Justice Department may 
have an easier time challenging Comcast’s specific practice of exempting 
Xfinity app use from its data cap when watched through the Xbox video 
game console, while subjecting Netflix and other like services to the 
normally applied data cap.234 Their conclusions stem from Attorney 
General Eric Holder’s congressional testimony suggesting that this practice 
may violate a condition that the Justice Department placed on Comcast’s 
2011 merger with NBC Universal.235 First wondered if the general 
investigation “was generated out of a concern that Comcast is violating the 
decree they entered into.”236 
But setting aside any special provisions attached to the Comcast 
merger, it is unlikely that the Xbox issue actually violates general antitrust 
principles. Comcast offers a service known as Xfinity On Demand, which 
is available for Xfinity cable subscribers to watch on television using a 
traditional cable box.237 Customers who subscribe to both Xfinity cable 
service and Comcast broadband service may also access Xfinity On 
Demand using the Xfinity App on Microsoft’s Xbox 360 video game 
console, which is connected to the television and the Internet. When a 
customer chooses to access Xfinity On Demand via the Xfinity App, the 
data used to view the service is exempt from the customer’s monthly cap—
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even though other content viewed through the Xbox, such as Netflix, 
continues to count against the cap. 
Although at first blush this arrangement appears discriminatory, it is 
hard to show any consumer harm because of the way the offer is structured. 
The exemption flows from Microsoft’s ongoing efforts to market the Xbox 
as an alternative to a traditional cable set-top box. The Xfinity App is only 
available to customers who subscribe to Comcast’s cable service, and the 
exemption only applies when the customer views Xfinity content on the 
customer’s television through the Xbox. Accessing the Xfinity App on a 
computer or tablet would incur data use subject to the cap. Ultimately, this 
means only that existing Xfinity cable customers are free to use an Xbox in 
lieu of a traditional cable box to view cable content on their televisions. 
Netflix may complain that the exemption leads Comcast customers to 
watch Xfinity rather than Netflix content using the Xbox, because Xfinity 
content does not incur data charges. But importantly, a customer may 
already do this regardless of the exemption, simply by turning on the cable 
box.  
From the consumer’s standpoint, therefore, the exemption is merely a 
matter of convenience. Traditional cable consumption on television does 
not count toward monthly data limits, and no one seems to be suggesting 
that it should. The Xbox exemption merely allows customers to watch 
traditional cable consumption on television using the Xbox rather than a 
traditional set-top box as the conduit. This innovation is proconsumer, in 
that it gives consumers a choice of receivers for their television and 
perhaps allows some consumers to avoid Comcast’s monthly set-top box 
rental fees. But the consumer is not receiving any new cap-exempt content 
as a result of the agreement, because the consumer already receives the 
same cap-exempt Xfinity programming through the cable system. Thus, 
while at first blush this dispute looks like an example of the potential ills of 
data caps, ultimately the issue does little to undermine the potential benefits 
of experimenting with various forms of usage-based pricing. 
C. Data Caps and Market Power 
The antitrust analysis of data caps in Section IV.A suggests that 
critics’ opposition to data caps is somewhat misplaced. The real threat to 
consumer welfare is not usage-based pricing, but market power. After all, a 
firm with market power can exploit consumers whether it relies on usage-
based pricing or flat-rate pricing. A broadband provider with market power 
that wishes to offset lost cable revenue through additional broadband 
revenue need not use data caps to deter or punish video cord-cutters. It 
could simply raise standalone flat-rate broadband prices to punish those 
who do not also purchase cable service. And any broadband provider 
lacking market power could not gouge customers under either scenario, 
because affected consumers would simply take their business elsewhere. 
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As the Commission noted, vertically integrated firms often have 
incentives to leverage power in one market to improve their position in 
another market. The Madison River investigation is a testament to this 
possibility. Madison River Communications paid a $15,000 fine to the 
Commission in 2005 to settle allegations that it blocked third-party Voice-
over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) services from operating on its network 
because these VoIP services competed against Madison River’s traditional 
telephone network.238 Regulators should remain vigilant with regard to 
potentially anticompetitive conduct, but they should also heed antitrust 
law’s lesson that many vertical restraints are procompetitive, and absent 
market power, consumers can punish those that are not without help from 
the Justice Department.  
Therefore, while there are risks that usage-based pricing can become 
a tool for anticompetitive conduct, this does not undermine the potential 
benefits of allowing firms to experiment with the practice. There may be 
significant consumer benefits that flow from data caps and other forms of 
usage-based pricing. And when a pricing change adversely affects 
consumers, usually they can punish this behavior by switching providers. 
Regulatory enforcement should usually step in only if a company has 
wielded market power in a way that causes actual harm to consumers. As a 
result, any enforcement should take the form of ex post adjudication of 
specific harmful conduct, rather than ex ante prohibitions on pricing tools 
that help broadband providers improve the efficiency of the network. 
VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSPARENCY 
To temper the concerns addressed above, and alleviate the concerns 
of both critics and consumers about the introduction and use of data caps, 
providers should clearly communicate to the public any changes in 
practices. On a basic level, this transparency is mandated by the FCC’s 
Open Internet Order. The order requires that  
a person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding 
the network management practices, performance, and 
commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services 
sufficient for consumers to make informed choices regarding 
use of such services and for content, application, service, and 
device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet 
offerings.239 
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Clear disclosure of a firm’s network management practices, including 
its billing practices, is an integral component of robust competition.240 
Customers can compare different broadband providers only if they have an 
accurate description of each firm’s value proposition. Clear disclosure also 
puts content and application providers on notice of potential ways that 
these practices affect their customers’ behavior, so they can adjust their 
business models accordingly.241 
But disclosure of billing terms is not the only way the firm should 
communicate its plans to consumers. As Odlyzko notes, consumers prefer 
flat rates to metered rates, in part because they tend to overestimate their 
monthly data consumption and because of the mental transaction costs of 
making decisions under a metered regime.242 Unlike minutes on a long-
distance plan, megabytes are difficult units for consumers to conceptualize. 
But to achieve efficiency gains from usage-based pricing, a network 
provider must assure that its users generally understand how much data 
each online transaction consumes. To migrate successfully to usage-based 
prices without adversely affecting its reputation with customers, the 
provider should take steps to correct this overestimation and convince users 
that they are better off with usage-based pricing.  
Graber suggests sending customers a bill comparing their flat-rate 
pricing with a hypothetical usage-based bill that shows both total use and 
potential savings under the new plan.243 Providers might also circulate fliers 
on a regular basis noting the average amount of data consumed by popular 
activities, like Comcast did when it first adopted a data cap in 2008. As 
data consumption enters the zeitgeist, Internet content and application 
providers may also meet consumer demand by providing estimates of how 
much data individual actions might consume. Application developers in 
Apple’s App Store and the Google Play Store routinely say how large each 
application is, so the consumer understands how much storage space the 
program will consume on the consumer’s device. The market for Internet 
content and applications may ultimately evolve to provide similar 
information about consumption when possible. 
Finally, providers need to make it easy for consumers to check their 
monthly data use. Most providers that have adopted usage-based pricing 
already make this information readily available to consumers through an 
application on the consumer’s device or a web-based interface. Many also 
provide emails or text messages warning customers when monthly use 
begins to approach certain limits (such as a data cap). The prevalence of 
these tools shows that they are both feasible to provide and popular with 
consumers. Any firm considering usage-based pricing should make them 
available to consumers once the transition is complete. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, data caps and other pricing strategies are ways that 
broadband companies can distinguish themselves from one another to 
achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace. When firms 
experiment with different business models, they can tailor services to niche 
audiences whose interests are inadequately satisfied by a one-size-fits-all 
plan. Absent anticompetitive concerns, public policy should encourage 
companies to experiment with different pricing models as a way to compete 
against one another. 
As Christopher Yoo has noted, the trend toward pricing 
experimentation in telecommunications mirrors a greater trend toward 
greater experimentation and ex post oversight in antitrust law generally.244 
Usage-based pricing can be a useful tool for broadband providers to create 
differentiation in the marketplace by spreading network costs in new ways 
and can promote greater efficiency by consumers, content providers, and 
the network operator itself. Only through experimentation and empirical 
measurement will providers find the optimal pricing solution—which may 
vary from network to network. Regulators have correctly rejected the call 
to interfere with this pricing flexibility by imposing broadband price 
controls. They should continue to do so, absent a showing of market failure 
and consumer harm. There is no reason to believe that a one-size-fits-all 
pricing plan represents the only or even the best option in an increasingly 
diverse Internet ecosystem.  
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